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INTRODUCTION 
ince the repeal of Israel’s sodomy law more than two decades ago, 
Israeli gay men and lesbians, as well as same-sex couples and their 
families, have gained wide protection and recognition in various legal 
fields. However, while a growing number of countries are in the process 
of lifting the ban on same-sex marriage, there is no legal option to even 
consider such a reform in the state of Israel. 
Unlike other Western nations, which began regarding and regulating 
marriage as a secular civil right as early as the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries,1 Israel is the only democratic country whose laws of marriage 
and divorce are still governed exclusively by religious law. Notwith-
standing the otherwise liberal and secular Israeli legal system, matters of 
marriage and divorce of the members of each of the recognized religious 
communities in Israel2 are adjudicated by their respective religious tri-
bunals and are subject to substantive religious laws.3 For Jewish Israelis, 
                                                                                                             
 1. The transition from religious law to the regulation of marriage as a secular civil 
right had begun in the 18th and 19th centuries with the end of the Church’s monopolistic 
jurisdiction and the introduction of civil marriage. See Amnon Rubinstein, The Right to 
Marriage, 3 IYUNEI MISHPAT 433, 433 (1973) (Isr.). 
 2. Today, besides the Jewish community, there are thirteen Recognized Religious 
Communities in Israel: the Muslim, Eastern Orthodox, Latin Catholic, Gregorian Arme-
nian, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Chaldean Uniate, Greek Catholic-Melkite, 
Maronite, Syrian Orthodox, Druze (since 1962), Episcopal-Evangelical (since 1970) and 
Baha’i (since 1971) communities. The last two do not have their own religious tribunals. 
For a list of the Recognized Religious Communities, see Palestine (Amendment) Order in 
Council, 1939, in THE PALESTINE GAZETTE 459, 465 (1939) (adding the Second Schedule 
to the Palestine Order in Council, 1922–1947). 
 3. Israel inherited the exclusive application of religious laws in matters of marriage 
and divorce from the Ottoman Empire’s millet (religious community) system. See Ariel 
Rosen-Zvi, Family and Inheritance Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 75, 75 
(Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995); see also Amnon Rubinstein, Law 
and Religion in Israel, 2 ISR. L. REV. 380, 384 (1967). Under Ottoman rule, the recog-
nized religious communities were granted autonomy in matters of personal status. Ru-
binstein, supra note 3. This system was largely preserved by the British Mandate rule and 
later adopted by the Israeli legislature with certain amendments. Id. at 385; Rosen-Zvi, 
supra note 3. Israel’s preservation of the status quo in the field of personal status is usual-
ly explained as having been intended to avoid conflict between the secular political par-
ties and the religious ones. See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 3. Accordingly, Section 2 of the 
Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law of 1953 provides that: “Mar-
riages and divorces of Jews shall be performed in Israel in accordance with Jewish reli-
gious law.” Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713–1953, 7 
LSI 139, § 2 (1952–1953) (Isr.). Regarding the application of religious law to members 
of other religious communities in Israel, see Palestine Order in Council, 1922, arts. 52, 54 
& 64, in 2 LAWS OF PALESTINE 420, 432–34 (Moses Doukhan ed., 1934). Since the Otto-
man rule and up to the present day, the exclusive authority to conduct marriages and noti-
S 
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the law that governs in matters of personal status is the Jewish law as 
interpreted by Orthodox Judaism. According to Orthodox Jewish law, 
same-sex relationships are “completely forbidden” and are regarded “as a 
sin and an abomination.”4 In keeping with this view, same-sex marriage 
is not even considered as a forbidden category under Israeli law; it is 
simply nonexistent.5 Moreover, since political religious parties have been 
part of every government in Israel and have always had a balancing pow-
er in any coalition, it is highly improbable that the Israeli legislature will 
be inclined to provide an arrangement for non-religious, civil marriage, 
even for opposite-sex couples. 
Same-sex couples are not the only group of Israeli citizens and resi-
dents adversely affected by the lack of an option to marry in a civil cer-
emony and by the exclusive application of religious law in matters of 
marriage and divorce. Many opposite-sex couples are also excluded from 
the Israeli institution of marriage due to a long list of religious restric-
tions and impediments.6 Although attempts to establish a comprehensive 
                                                                                                             
fy the authorities for the purpose of registration is granted to the priests of the various 
religious communities. See Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Ordinance, 1919, § 2, in 
2 THE LAWS OF PALESTINE 903 (Robert Harry Drayton ed., 1934). 
 4. Rachel Sara Rosenthal, Of Pearls and Fish: An Analysis of Jewish Legal Texts on 
Sexuality and Their Significance for Contemporary American Jewish Movements, 15 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 485, 530 (2006). “Orthodox Judaism regards the Hebrew Bible 
as the ultimate authority of Jewish law.” Id. The Bible characterizes sexual relations be-
tween men (alongside other prohibited sexual contacts, including bestiality and incest) as 
an “abomination” that justifies putting both men to death (Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13). 
See id. at 523; Steven Greenberg, WRESTLING WITH GOD AND MEN: HOMOSEXUALITY IN 
THE JEWISH TRADITION 74–85 (2004). 
 5. Jewish law, as interpreted by Orthodox Judaism, leaves no room for a more le-
nient approach towards same-sex unions, such as that of the Conservative or Reform 
movements. See Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 508–09, 530. Unlike Orthodox Judaism, the 
Conservative and the Reform movements, especially in the United States, have shown not 
only tolerance towards same-sex unions, but have also begun to allow for the celebration 
of same-sex commitment ceremonies. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Conservative Jews 
Allow Gay Rabbis and Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A26. For an overview of the 
differing views on homosexuality and same-sex relationships among the various Jewish 
movements, see generally Rosenthal, supra note 4. A liberal religious approach towards 
same-sex unions is also exemplified by the recent amendment to the English Civil Part-
nership Act of 2004, which removed the express prohibition preventing same-sex civil 
partnership ceremonies from being held on religious premises. See Church Gay Ceremo-
nies Ban Lifted, BBC NEWS (Mar. 3, 2010, 10:09 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8546827.stm. The amendment allows religious groups to let civil 
partnership ceremonies take place in their churches, mosques, synagogues and the like, if 
they choose to do so. See id. 
 6. See infra note 222 and accompanying text. For a detailed overview of the mar-
riage impediments placed on opposite-sex couples by religious law in Israel, see Yuval 
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alternative system for Israelis who cannot or do not wish to undergo a 
religious marriage have largely been unsuccessful, opposite-sex couples 
ineligible for religious marriage may benefit, in the future, from a civil 
partnership registry, which would accord those couples most (but not all) 
of the rights and responsibilities associated with marriage.7 This partial 
solution, however, would not apply to Israeli same-sex couples, who 
would be obliged to continue traveling outside of Israel in order to real-
ize their basic right to marriage. Moreover, since marriage recognition is 
one of the most undeveloped fields of Israeli private international law, 
and since Israel lacks a statutory choice of law rule regarding the validity 
of the foreign marriages of its residents and nationals, it is unclear 
whether those foreign marriages would be recognized under the Israeli 
conflict of laws. 
The Israeli Rabbinical courts interpret Jewish law as universally appli-
cable and refuse to apply principles of private international law.8 Other 
religious tribunals hold the same view.9 Thus, the religious tribunals 
would flatly reject recognition of foreign civil marriages of couples who 
lack capacity under their respective religious law. However, the recogni-
tion of a foreign marriage may also arise—as an incidental question—in 
the civil family courts, which have concurrent jurisdiction over some of 
the incidents of marriage, such as maintenance obligations, and exclusive 
jurisdiction in other fields of family law, such as succession. The Israeli 
civil courts have always regarded the principles of private international 
law as having precedence over all domestic legislation, including the 
laws of marriage and divorce.10 Therefore, unlike the religious tribunals, 
                                                                                                             
Merin, The Right to Family Life and Civil Marriage Under International Law and Its 
Implementation in the State of Israel, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 79, 135–36 (2005) 
[hereinafter Merin, The Right To Family Life]. 
 7. On March 15, 2010, the Israeli legislature passed a limited civil union bill, re-
served only for Israeli opposite-sex couples “with no officially defined religion.” See 
Rebecca Anna Stoil, Knesset Passes Civil Union Bill, JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 16, 2010), 
http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=171084. The civil union law may be ex-
panded in the future to include other groups of Israeli opposite-sex couples who are una-
ble to marry under religious law. See Michael Toiba & Dan Izenberg, Civil Unions Law 
to be Implemented Next Week, JERUSALEM POST (Nov. 4, 2010, 3:24 AM), 
http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=193934. 
 8. See CA 191/51 Skornik v. Skornik 8(1) PD 141 [1954] (Isr.) (“[Religious] law 
knows no bounds or limits and applies to a person from his birth until his death in all 
matters affecting his personal status, without any reference to the place where, or the time 
in which, an occurrence may have taken place.”). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. at 179. 
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the civil courts may consider the recognition of a foreign same-sex mar-
riage on its merits. 
The Israeli Supreme Court, perceiving the matter as raising intricate 
questions of religion-state relations, has consistently refrained from de-
ciding the validity or recognition under Israeli law of foreign civil mar-
riages of opposite-sex couples ineligible for marriage in Israel (let alone 
same-sex couples).11 In 2006, the Supreme Court finally accorded full 
recognition to foreign civil marriages of Israeli Jewish couples who were 
eligible for religious marriage in Israel, but decided to undergo a civil 
ceremony abroad.12 In doing so, the Court held that such marriages were 
valid by virtue of the English rules of private international law, but de-
clined to state which rules should apply in other circumstances, leaving 
the matter for further consideration.13 Additionally, Israeli courts are not 
bound to apply English rules of private international law in cases of la-
cunae,14 and since the decision was limited to couples who qualify for 
religious marriage, it remains to be seen whether a same-sex marriage 
performed outside of Israel will be fully recognized by the Israeli courts. 
The Israeli Supreme Court has, however, developed two legal mechan-
isms that accord some of the rights associated with marriage to those 
couples whose foreign civil marriages are not yet recognized in Israel. 
The first mechanism, which was also applied to the foreign marriages of 
Israeli same-sex couples,15 mandates the registration of the foreign civil 
marriage (valid in the place of celebration) in the Israeli Population Re-
gistry, notwithstanding the couple’s capacity to marry in Israel according 
to their personal religious laws.16 The second mechanism—regarded as 
“partial recognition” or the “marriage incidents” approach—is the recog-
nition of various incidents of the foreign civil marriage, while avoiding 
the question of validity.17 Both mechanisms, however, are limited and 
unsatisfactory solutions, as they grant the couples very few of the rights 
associated with marriage, leaving them uncertain of their status and of 
their rights and obligations vis-à-vis one another. 
                                                                                                             
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. HCJ 2232/03 A. v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Regional Rabbinical Court (2) IsrLR 245 
[2006]. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. In the past, Israeli courts were instructed to defer to English common law in cases 
of lacunae. However, since 1980, by virtue of the Foundations Law Act, the courts are 
permitted to draw analogies from any foreign case law. See infra Part III. 
 15. See HCJ 3045/05 Ben-Ari v. Director of Population Administration [2006] (2) 
IsrLR 283. 
 16. See HCJ 143/62 Funk-Schlesinger v. Minister of Interior 17(1) PD 225 [1963] 
(Isr.). 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
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The question of whether marriages of Israeli same-sex couples abroad 
would be fully recognized raises complex legal problems insolvable un-
der current Israeli positive law. First, since the courts have thus far de-
clined to decide which choice of law rules should apply in cases involv-
ing couples ineligible for religious marriage, it is unclear which of the 
two competing systems of private international law in the field of mar-
riage recognition apply in such circumstances: the rule of the place of 
celebration (lex loci celebrationis), which is the principal rule in the 
United States, or the personal law system, practiced in England and most 
of Continental Europe. Second, even if Israel adopts a choice of law rule 
that enables the recognition of a foreign same-sex marriage, it is still un-
clear whether or not courts would ultimately deny recognition of such 
marriages as contrary to public policy. 
This Article purports to answer the abovementioned questions. Part II 
of the Article discusses the existing alternatives to the full recognition of 
a foreign same-sex marriage (registration and “marriage incidents”), and 
examines the legal and practical distinctions between those alternatives 
on the one hand, and full recognition on the other hand. Drawing on 
comparative law, the remainder of the Article discusses the likelihood of 
recognition of foreign same-sex marriages under Israeli law. 
Part III analyzes the developments in Israeli choice of law jurispru-
dence regarding the recognition of marriages celebrated outside the ju-
risdiction. It concludes that Israeli positive law does not regulate the mat-
ter and that the lacuna should be filled by resort to comparative law. Ac-
cordingly, Part IV discusses the various systems of private international 
law in the field of marriage recognition and examines which of the com-
peting choice of law rules is most appropriate—in light of the unique 
social and legal situation in Israel—for determining the validity of for-
eign marriages conducted by Israeli same-sex couples as well as oppo-
site-sex couples ineligible for religious marriage in Israel. This Part of 
the Article also examines the policy objectives of the choice of law rules 
in the field of marriage recognition and critically contrasts the English 
personal law system with the American principle of lex loci celebratio-
nis. 
Based on the scope and application of the public policy exception in 
comparative law, Part V proposes several preliminary guidelines for the 
appropriate scope and interpretation of Israel’s external public policy in 
matters of personal status. For this purpose, the article delineates the un-
derlying rationales and objectives of the various marital impediments 
imposed by Israeli domestic religious law. This Part also examines 
whether religious norms (which are exclusively applied in matters of 
marriage and divorce within Israel) should also be considered in the 
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framing of the public policy exception. The Article concludes that courts 
could and should fully recognize foreign marriages of Israeli same-sex 
couples and that recognition of those marriages is not contrary to Israeli 
public policy. 
II. ALTERNATIVES TO THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGES 
Despite the lack of full recognition and validation of certain foreign 
civil marriages, the Israeli Supreme Court provides two legal mechan-
isms in order to accord some marital benefits to those couples: registra-
tion of foreign civil marriages in the Israeli Population Registry and rec-
ognition of various incidents of the foreign marriage. Both these mechan-
isms, as well as their applicability to the foreign marriages of same-sex 
couples, are discussed below. 
A. Registration of Foreign Civil Marriages 
In the 1961 case of Funk-Schlesinger v. Minister of Interior, a Belgian 
Christian woman and an Israeli Jewish man, who were ineligible for mar-
riage in Israel due to the prohibition on interfaith marriages, married in a 
civil ceremony in Cyprus.18 Upon their return, and on the basis of the 
Cypriot marriage certificate, the wife, Mrs. Funk-Schlesinger, applied to 
be registered as “married” in the Israeli Population Registry.19 The Mi-
nister of Interior claimed that under the applicable rules of private inter-
national law the spouses were not married, and thus refused the applica-
tion.20 The Supreme Court mandated the registration of the Cypriot mar-
riage in the Israeli Population Registry, notwithstanding the couple’s in-
eligibility to marry in Israel.21 The court reasoned that the purpose of the 
Registry is the collection of statistical data, and that the registration of 
marital status is merely an administrative procedure which does not con-
stitute even prima facie evidence of its validity.22 
The court further reasoned that the registration official had no judicial 
power and that his function was limited to collecting statistical material 
for the purpose of maintaining the register of residents.23 Therefore, 
when the official is requested to register a foreign marriage, he has no 
authority or discretion to inquire into the couple’s capacity to marry in 
                                                                                                             
 18. HCJ 143/62 Funk-Schlesinger v. Minister of Interior 17(1) PD 225 [1963] (Isr.). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 249. 
 23. Id. at 244. 
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Israel or into the validity of the foreign marriage under Israeli law. 
“[T]he question of the validity of the ceremony that took place is a multi-
faceted one and examining the validity of the marriage falls outside the 
scope of the Population Registry.”24 The court concluded that once the 
registration official is presented with an authenticated marriage certifi-
cate, he is obliged to register the couple as married unless he questions 
its authenticity.25 Hence, according to the rule established in Funk-
Schlesinger, the registration official must enter any information provided 
by applicants into the Population Registry, unless it is manifestly incor-
rect (e.g., if the official is asked to register a 20 year-old man as being 5 
years of age). 
Courts have followed the Funk-Schlesinger decision consistently over 
the years in a variety of circumstances. Accordingly, in the 2000 case of 
Brenner-Kaddish v. Minister of Interior, a lesbian couple requested their 
registration in the Population Registry as the dual mothers of the biologi-
cal child of one of them (born via artificial insemination), who was 
adopted by the other while the couple was living in California.26 The reg-
istration official refused the request, arguing that the existence of two 
parents of the same-sex was biologically impossible, and therefore the 
requested registration would be manifestly incorrect.27 The Supreme 
Court applied the Funk-Schlesinger rule and mandated the registration of 
each of the spouses as the “mother” of the child in accordance with the 
foreign adoption decree.28 In doing so, the Court rejected the State’s ar-
gument regarding the incorrectness of the registration and implied that 
the State’s position was in fact a pretext for its disapproval of adoptions 
in the context of a same-sex family.29 Even though the Court refrained 
from taking a position as to the validity of the foreign adoption order un-
der Israeli law, it held that for the purpose of registration, the foreign 
adoption order should be presumed valid unless declared otherwise by a 
competent court.30 Thus, in the absence of any contention with regard to 
the correctness of the details presented by the applicants, and since rec-
ognition of the foreign decree is not a prerequisite for its registration, the 
official must register the couple as requested.31 
                                                                                                             
 24. Id. at 252. 
 25. Id. 
 26. HCJ 1779/99 Brenner-Kaddish v. Minister of Interior 54(2) PD 368 [2000] (Isr.). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 376–77. The State had requested a further hearing of the case arguing that 
unlike marriage, which is a mere administrative act, a foreign adoption order—being a 
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In 2006, in the case of Ben-Ari v. Director of Population Administra-
tion, the Israeli Supreme Court was faced, for the first time, with the 
question of whether the Funk-Schlesinger rule should also apply to the 
foreign marriages of Israeli same-sex couples. The case involved five 
same-sex couples, citizens and residents of Israel, who had undergone 
civil marriage ceremonies in Toronto, in accordance with Canadian 
law.32 Upon their return to Israel, the couples applied for registration as 
“married” at the Population Registry.33 The registration official refused 
the applications, stating that “‘marriages of this kind are not legally rec-
ognized in the State of Israel, and therefore it is not possible to register 
them in the [Registry].’”34 The couples thus petitioned the Supreme 
Court, arguing that the refusal to register their marriages was unlawful.35 
The petitioners argued that the Funk-Schlesinger precedent, which un-
til that time had been applied only to the foreign civil marriages of oppo-
site-sex couples, should also apply to the marriages of same-sex cou-
ples.36 In response, the State argued that a distinction should be drawn 
between registration of a foreign marriage—notwithstanding its valid-
ity—that satisfies the existing, basic “legal framework” of marriage in 
Israel, and registration of a marriage that is inconsistent with this legal 
framework.37 According to the State, since the legal framework of mar-
riage in Israel relates only to a marriage between a man and a woman, 
and since there is no recognized legal framework of marriage between 
two persons of the same sex, the Funk-Schlesinger rule should be limited 
to the registration of the marriages of opposite-sex couples.38 
The Supreme Court rejected the State’s arguments and ordered the reg-
istration official to enter the foreign same-sex marriages in the popula-
                                                                                                             
judicial decision—could be registered only if it was previously recognized by a compe-
tent court. See id. However, since the Supreme Court has subsequently allowed for same-
sex second parent adoptions within the State of Israel, see CA 10280/01 Yaros-Hakak v. 
Attorney-General 59(5) PD 64 [2005] (Isr.), the further hearing of the Brenner-Kaddish 
case became moot. 
 32. HCJ 3045/05 Ben-Ari v. Director of Population Administration (2) IsrLR 283 
[2006]. 
 33. Id. ¶ 1. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. ¶ 1–2. Since the Supreme Court had consistently refused to rule on the validi-
ty of foreign civil marriages of Israeli couples ineligible for marriage in Israel, the peti-
tioners in Ben-Ari sufficed with requiring the registration of their foreign marriages and 
did not apply for those marriages to be given validity in Israel. 
 36. Id. ¶ 2. 
 37. Id. ¶ 3. 
 38. Id. 
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tion registry.39 The Court held that for the limited purpose of registration, 
no distinction should be drawn between the foreign marriages of oppo-
site-sex couples and those of same-sex couples: 
The population registry was not intended to decide the question of the 
existence or absence of legal frameworks; the registration official is not 
competent to determine whether there is a recognized ‘legal frame-
work’ or merely a ‘social framework with a certain legal significance’; 
the register provides statistical data with regard to personal events 
(such as birth, death, marriage and divorce), not legal constructions that 
have passed the discerning scrutiny of the registration official. It is not 
right that the legal struggle concerning personal status should take 
place in the field of registration.40 
The Court stressed that under Funk-Schlesinger, the registration of a 
couple as “married” in the Population Registry is merely an administra-
tive act that has no bearing on the legal validity of the marriage in Israel, 
and again, that registration of the personal status does not constitute even 
prima facie evidence of its correctness.41 
Since the Ben-Ari ruling, Israeli same-sex couples who marry abroad 
are routinely registered in the Population Registry. Despite the Registry’s 
limited legal force, the Israeli authorities, in practice, rely on the registra-
tion for the purpose of granting various spousal benefits, without inquir-
ing into the validity of the marriage in Israel.42 Thus, Israeli couples who 
marry abroad and register as “married” upon their return—including 
same-sex couples—may benefit from a few of the rights that flow from 
the institution, such as social security, taxation, and the like. However, 
the registration of the foreign marriage is a partial and inadequate solu-
tion. 
                                                                                                             
 39. See id. ¶ 23. 
 40. Id. ¶ 17. 
 41. See id. ¶ 7. Section 2 of the Population Registry Law sets out the items of infor-
mation concerning Israeli residents that should be registered in the Population Registry 
(including family name, date of birth, etc.). See Population Registry Law, 5725–1965, 19 
LSI 288 (1964–1965) (Isr.). Section 2(7) provides that the Registry should also include 
the personal status of the resident. Id. § 2(7). Section 3 provides that “The registration at 
the Registry, any copy or extract thereof and also any certificate that was given under this 
law shall constitute prima facie evidence of the correctness of the registration items set 
out in paragraphs (1) to (4) and (9) to (13) of section 2.” Id. § 3. Note that paragraph (7) 
is not among those items for which registration constitutes prima facie evidence of cor-
rectness. 
 42. See Menashe Shava, Civil Marriages Celebrated Abroad: Validity in Israel, 9 
TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN LAW [TEL AVIV U. STUD. L.] 311, 321–22 (1989) [he-
reinafter Shava, Civil Marriages Celebrated Abroad]. 
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First, given that registration does not constitute even prima facie evi-
dence of a marriage’s validity, the authorities may decide, at any given 
time, to change their policy and cease relying on the registration or make 
exceptions for various circumstances. Second, registration has limited 
practical implications in that it only entails the de facto recognition of the 
marriage by third parties. However, registration has no legal bearing on 
the other two aspects of the legal regulation of marriage: the rights and 
obligations between the spouses during the marriage, and the dissolution 
of the marriage. As far as these aspects of marriage are concerned, regis-
tration does not entail any personal status, even de facto, and thus affords 
no control over that status. Therefore, same-sex Israeli couples of the 
same religion who marry in Canada and return to Israel less than a year 
later cannot divorce each other either in Israel43 or in Canada44 nor can 
they change their registration from “married” in the Ministry of Inte-
rior.45 Only full recognition of these marriages for the purpose of divorce 
could resolve the paradoxical obstacle faced by same-sex couples who 
wish to dissolve their foreign marriages. 
Thus, although the registration of marriage bears a few practical ad-
vantages as mentioned above, there are significant differences between 
the administrative act of registering a personal status and the judicial act 
of recognizing the validity of the foreign marriage. In light of these dif-
ferences, it is clear that the registration of marriages does not replace the 
need for judicial ruling regarding their essential validity. 
                                                                                                             
 43. Same-sex couples belonging to the same recognized religion certainly cannot 
initiate divorce proceedings in the religious tribunals in Israel, which have exclusive ju-
risdiction over the matter. Nonetheless, there is no apparent reason why the Matters of 
Dissolution of Marriage (Jurisdiction in Special Cases) Law should not apply to the an-
nulment of same-sex marriages (where both are residents and citizens of Israel) where the 
couple is of different religions or without religious affiliation. The authority to dissolve a 
marriage of that sort rests with the Family Court, which is authorized to annul marriages 
in accordance with the law of the place of celebration (Sec. 5 of the same law). See Mat-
ters of Dissolution of Marriage (Jurisdiction in Special Cases) Law, 5729–1969, 23 LSI 
274 § 5 (1968–1969) (Isr.); see also Talia Einhorn, Same-Sex Family Unions in Israeli 
Law, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 222, 233–34 (2008). 
 44. Although foreign residents and citizens are allowed to marry in Canada, in order 
for a Canadian court to obtain jurisdiction over divorce proceedings, Canadian law re-
quires a minimum of one year of residency in Canada prior to the initiation of the pro-
ceeding. See Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3, §3(1) (Can.). 
 45. Section 19(C) of the Population Registry Law provides that a change in the regis-
tration of an item shall be recorded in accordance with a “public certificate” that testifies 
to the change. Population Registry Law, 5725–1965, 19 LSI 288 §19(C) (1964–1965) 
(Isr.). The relevant “public certificate” in cases of divorce is a domestic or a foreign di-
vorce decree. Since same-sex Israeli residents cannot obtain such a decree, see supra note 
43, they are unable to change their registration. 
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The Court in Ben-Ari repeatedly stressed that the case involved only 
the question of the registration official’s authority, and not the question 
of the validity of the marriage.46 In this respect, the Court noted that 
when the question of “recogniz[ing] a marriage between two persons of 
the same sex that took place outside Israel . . . . arises, it will be exam-
ined in accordance with [the] accepted rules of private international 
law.”47 Before turning to consider the applicable rules of private interna-
tional law in such circumstances, however, it is useful to first examine 
another mechanism employed by the Supreme Court in cases concerning 
the legal implications of civil marriages conducted abroad—the “mar-
riage incidents” approach. This solution constitutes a middle-ground be-
tween the mere registration of the foreign marriage and the full recogni-
tion of its validity. 
B. The “Marriage Incidents” Approach 
For nearly forty years, the Israeli Supreme Court compelled the Minis-
try of Interior to register the foreign marriages of Israeli citizens and res-
idents, but refrained from ruling on the question of their full or partial 
validity. During the last decade, the Supreme Court developed an addi-
tional mechanism, the “marriage incidents” approach, which allows cer-
tain couples married in civil ceremonies abroad to obtain various rights 
associated with marriage. 
This approach stems from the distinction between marriage as a status 
and the incidents of marriage.48 It is employed by judicial recognition of 
certain rights flowing from the foreign marriage without conferring the 
full status of marriage.49 Except for instances in which the validity of the 
                                                                                                             
 46. HCJ 3045/05 Ben-Ari v. Director of Population Administration (2) IsrLR 283 
[2006]. As the Court stated: “[T]he question before us is not whether a marriage between 
persons of the same sex, which took place outside Israel, is valid in Israel. . . . The ques-
tion before us is whether the registration official—whose authority is prescribed in the 
Population Registry Law . . . —acted within the scope of his authority when he refused to 
register the marriage of the two men in the register.” Id. at 286–87. 
 47. Id. ¶ 22. 
 48. “‘Incidents of marriage’ refer to each of the specific benefits, rights, or responsi-
bilities flowing to a married couple based on their marital status,” such as government 
benefits, property rights and the like. Barbara J. Cox, Using an “Incidents of Marriage” 
Analysis When Considering Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, 
Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L.J. 699, 718–19 (2004). 
 49. On this approach in the United States context, see In re Estate of Shippy, 678 P.2d 
848, 850 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
ch. 11, intro. note (1971) (“In law, a status can be viewed from two standpoints. It can be 
viewed as a relationship which continues as the parties move from state to state, or it can 
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marriage as such is the principal question (e.g., a suit for a declaratory 
judgment to directly recognize the marriage), the majority of legal pro-
ceedings concerning marriages performed outside the jurisdiction seek to 
obtain one of the rights deriving from marriage, such as spousal support, 
inheritance or division of property.50 In the latter cases, the question of 
the marriage’s validity arises only as an incidental question in determin-
ing the remedy to be granted.51 
In such cases, the court may first decide the incidental question of the 
marriage’s validity and then, upon finding a valid marriage, grant the 
remedy. Alternatively, it may decide whether to grant the remedy as an 
independent matter, without ruling on the validity of the marriage. Courts 
in the United States and England traditionally viewed the question of 
marital status as a prerequisite to a ruling on the various rights flowing 
from such status.52 Accordingly, courts customarily ruled first and fore-
most on the question of the marriage’s validity, and based on that ruling, 
rendered their decision on the remedy sought.53 This approach was based 
on the viewpoint that the incidents of marriage are inseparable from the 
status itself, and thus the entire set of rights and obligations entailed in 
the status are dependent upon its recognition.54 
However, this concept of recognition as controlling all the incidents 
flowing from marital status could lead to an “all-or-nothing” approach to 
the recognition of foreign marriages that are inconsistent with accepted 
views of marriage in a given forum.55 For this reason, courts in the Unit-
ed States have begun to adopt an interim approach which allows the 
court to grant remedial relief.56 Even when a marriage (valid under the 
foreign law of the country of celebration) would not be recognized under 
the forum’s choice of law rules or due to its public policy, the court may 
still “recognize” the marriage as valid for the particular purpose of grant-
                                                                                                             
be viewed from the standpoint of the incidents that arise from it.”); PETER HAY, CONFLICT 
OF LAWS 123 (4th ed. 2003). 
 50. See Willis L. M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 952, 953 (1977). 
 51. For a thorough analysis of the incidental question in the conflict of laws, see gen-
erally A. E. Gottlieb, The Incidental Question Revisited—Theory and Practice in the 
Conflict of Laws, 26 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 734 (1977). 
 52. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 546 (3d ed. 2000). 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 567–68. 
 56. See LENNART PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS: 
SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS 38, 41 (1981) [hereinafter PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN 
COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS]. 
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ing a remedy.57 In accordance with this approach, United States courts 
have granted certain rights associated with the status of marriage in many 
cases of polygamous and incestuous marriages, which are otherwise con-
sidered contrary to public policy.58 
According to Israeli law, a recognized marriage is not a necessary pre-
condition for granting various rights traditionally considered to derive 
from marital status, and unmarried Israeli couples may acquire some of 
those rights via cohabitation.59 The rights accorded to cohabitant partners 
do not derive from the status of marriage, nor are they dependent upon it. 
Applying the same approach to foreign civil marriages, the Israeli Su-
preme Court has more than once treated the availability of the remedy 
sought as independent from the question of the marriage’s general validi-
ty. 
This approach was first implemented in the Jane Doe affair,60 which 
concerned an opposite-sex Jewish Israeli couple who married in a civil 
ceremony in Paraguay, in accordance with Paraguayan laws.61 The 
spouses were consequently registered as married in the Israeli Population 
Registry, and when their relationship broke down, the wife petitioned the 
family court for spousal support.62 The family court held that Israeli law 
does not recognize such marriages and thus rejected the petition.63 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the wife claimed that she was entitled 
to spousal support since the marriage should be recognized under Israeli 
private international law.64 In keeping with its long-standing and consis-
tent position of refraining from deciding whether foreign civil marriages 
can be recognized in Israel, the Supreme Court chose not to rule on the 
                                                                                                             
 57. See id. 
 58. In these matters courts consider the nature of the remedy sought and the case-
specific circumstances, and typically examine whether granting the remedy would run 
counter to the rationale that prevents the marriage from being recognized by the forum. 
For instance, awarding inheritance rights in cases of incestuous marriages is not consi-
dered to contradict the aims of the prohibition on recognizing these marriages, as the 
prohibition is seen as intended, among other things, to prevent the couple from engaging 
in acts of sexual intimacy. See id. 
 59. Non-marital cohabitation has long been recognized by the Israeli legislature for 
various purposes (mainly in the field of social rights). See Shahar Lifshitz, A Potential 
Lesson from the Israeli Experience for the American Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 22 
BYU J. PUB. L. 359, 362 (2008). Over the years, the Supreme Court has expanded the 
institution to include additional rights associated with marriage. See id. at 362–63. 
 60. CA 8256/99 Doe v. Doe 58(2) PD 213 [2003] (Isr.). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 221. 
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validity of the marriage.65 Instead, the Court held that appellant’s en-
titlement to spousal support could be based on the contractual approach 
employed in the field of cohabitation.66 The Court held that the existence 
of civil contractual obligations between the parties did not depend upon 
recognition of their marriage in Israel.67 
[T]he explicit non-recognition of the marital status [indeed] negates the 
civil benefits deriving from it, and which do not exist without it. That 
said, non-recognition of a marriage as status does not serve to negate 
the civil benefits which are not derived from the status or depend upon 
it, and which have an independent existence by virtue of the civil law.68 
In implementing the contractual approach, the Court held that couples 
married in a civil ceremony abroad should be considered as cohabitant 
partners who had entered an implied contract to live together as mar-
ried—a contract which includes, inter alia, “civil” spousal support obli-
gations, whose duration and amount are determined according to the 
principle of good faith.69 The Court emphasized that its ruling was li-
mited to factually similar circumstances.70 In such cases, contract law 
may be applied to determine the spouses’ mutual obligations. The con-
tent of those obligations will be dependent upon the existence of a con-
tract.71 In the absence of a contract, the court will determine the rights 
and obligations of the parties according to the principle of good faith.72 
The Supreme Court implemented the “marriage incidents” mechanism 
in a number of additional cases. For instance, in 2006 the court held that 
a woman who had been married in a civil ceremony in Romania was en-
titled to inherit half of her deceased husband’s estate even absent full 
recognition of the validity of their foreign marriage.73 Similar to the case 
of Jane Doe, the court confined its discussion to the validity of the mar-
riage for the sole purpose of the issue of inheritance, signaling the under-
standing that the claim for a right deriving from a foreign marriage could 
be regarded as an independent question from that of the full validity of 
the marriage itself.74 The Court held that the term “spouse,” as conceived 
in Inheritance Law, is not limited to those who marry according to reli-
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 224. 
 68. Id. (author’s translation from the Hebrew). 
 69. Id. at 231–32. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. CAF 9607/03 X v. Y. (2006), Takdinet Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 74. Id. ¶ 14. 
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gious law, and further, foreign civil marriages that are valid in the place 
of celebration meet the standards set out in Inheritance Law.75 As the 
court states: “The family unit established consequent to the civil mar-
riage, and the interests of its members, deserve the support and protec-
tion of the legal system in general, and the laws of inheritance in particu-
lar.”76 
Indeed, the application of the “marriage incidents” approach to foreign 
civil marriages has contributed to the legal regulation of several aspects 
of the mutual rights and obligations of spouses during marriage. It would 
appear that there is no reason to refrain from applying this solution to the 
foreign marriages of same-sex couples as well, thereby according them 
various rights associated with marriage (such as spousal support and in-
heritance) without recognizing the validity of their marriage for other 
purposes. Nevertheless, the fact-sensitive “marriage incidents” approach 
has engendered a lack of uniformity in the manner in which the Israeli 
courts resolve the disputes arising between spouses married in civil ce-
remonies abroad, creating a sort of internal “limping marriage” whereby 
the marriage may be regarded as valid for one purpose but not for anoth-
er.77 Furthermore, according to this approach, the spouses are required to 
petition the courts each and every time there is a disagreement between 
them, without either party having any reasonable level of certainty about 
their rights and obligations vis-à-vis one another. Oftentimes, the spouses 
are likely to discover that they are entitled to relief based on their foreign 
marriage in one area but not in another. Therefore, this mechanism does 
not provide a dependable solution to most of the problems encountered 
by couples who perform a civil marriage ceremony outside of Israel. 
Moreover, it seems that the Supreme Court erred in choosing to refrain 
from ruling on the full validity of the foreign marriages in the cases dis-
cussed above and should have adopted an approach similar to that em-
ployed in the United States, where the marriage incidents solution is uti-
lized only in cases where the marriage is found invalid according to the 
forum’s choice of law rules or in violation of public policy.78 Israeli 
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. ¶¶ 17–20. 
 76. Id. ¶ 19. 
 77. For discussion of the concept of “limping marriages,” see, e.g., Martha Bailey, 
Hawaii’s Same-Sex Marriage Initiatives: Implications for Canada, 15 CAN. J. FAM. L., 
no. 1, 1998, at 153, 168–69. 
 78. See PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56. The 
Israeli Supreme Court’s unwillingness to rule on the question of the validity of civil mar-
riages between Israeli citizens and residents that are ineligible to marry in Israel was like-
ly based on apprehension over ruling on a controversial issue that is the subject of a 
heated public debate, and not because these marriages are invalid under the applicable 
laws. In the U.S., on the other hand, the “marriage incidents” method is implemented 
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courts should thus first make an effort to reach a favorable resolution 
regarding the full validity of the foreign marriage. Only when a court 
fails to do so should it make a decision to permit or deny the enjoyment 
of a particular incident attached to marital status independently from the 
validity of the marriage for other purposes. Accordingly, the next Part 
examines the possibility of recognizing foreign civil marriages as valid 
under Israeli conflict of laws principles. 
III. RECOGNITION OF OPPOSITE-SEX FOREIGN CIVIL MARRIAGES UNDER 
ISRAELI PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The legal solutions proposed to date—the “marriage incidents” ap-
proach and the registration of foreign civil marriages of those ineligible 
for marriage in Israel—are neither adequate nor satisfactory and they do 
not replace the need to rule on the question of full recognition of these 
marriages. However, the question of which choice of law rule applies to 
the recognition of foreign civil marriages of Israeli opposite-sex couples 
ineligible for marriage in Israel—not to mention same-sex couples—has 
yet to be answered. In the absence of original Israeli legislation or judi-
cial precedent in the matter, some claimed that the solution could be 
found in Article 47 of the Palestine Order in Council over the Land of 
Israel of 1922, enacted during the British Mandate and later incorporated 
into Israeli law, where it remains in force today.79 Article 47 confers ju-
risdiction upon the civil courts in matters of personal status in respect of 
“persons in Palestine” according to the “personal law” applicable to the 
parties.80 The Supreme Court has held that the “personal law” of Israeli 
citizens and residents is their religious law.81 
Over the years both scholars and Israeli Supreme Court justices ex-
pressed varied positions on the effect of Article 47 on the choice of law 
issue. The prevailing view interpreted the Article as an internal directive 
regarding the marriage and divorce of Israeli citizens within the borders 
                                                                                                             
only following a determination that a marriage of a certain kind (such as polygamous 
marriages) contradicts public policy and thus is not recognized as valid. See id. at 37–39. 
 79. See The Palestine Order in Council, 1922, art. 47, in 3 THE LAWS OF PALESTINE 
2569, 2580 (Robert Harry Drayton ed., 1934). 
 80. Article 47, entitled “Jurisdiction in personal status,” states: “The Civil Courts 
shall further have jurisdiction . . . in matters of personal status as defined in Article 51 of 
persons in Palestine. Such jurisdiction shall be exercised in conformity with any law, 
Ordinances or Regulations that may hereafter be applied or enacted and subject thereto 
according to the personal law applicable.” Id. However, “[s]ince 1922, no ‘law, Ordin-
ances or Regulations’ which would provide a basis for reviewing the validity of [a civil 
marriage contracted abroad by Israeli citizens and residents] have been enacted in Israel.” 
Shava, Civil Marriages Celebrated Abroad, supra note 42, at 322. 
 81. CA 26/51 Kotik v. Kotik 5(1) PD 1341, 1345 [1951] (Isr.). 
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of Israel.82 According to this view, Israel lacks a statutory choice of law 
rule regarding the validity of marriages of its residents and nationals con-
tracted abroad, and the matter is thus considered a lacuna.83 Others ar-
gued for the interpretation of Article 47 as a choice of law rule for mar-
riage recognition, referring to the national law as the connecting factor.84 
This complex interpretive question remained unresolved for a long pe-
riod of time. 
Given the vague language of Article 47, it was unclear whether courts 
would interpret it as an internal directive or as a choice of law rule for 
marriage recognition. The question first arose in Skornik v. Skornik, 
where the Supreme Court considered the validity of a civil marriage be-
tween Jewish spouses who wed while residents and citizens of Poland.85 
Upon their immigration to Israel, both spouses lost their Polish citizen-
ship and became stateless.86 When conflict arose between them, the hus-
band sued for the return of property, claiming that the marriage could not 
be recognized under Israeli law.87 In response, the wife filed a defense 
and counter-sued her husband for spousal support, arguing that their for-
eign marriage was valid in Israel by virtue of the English rules of private 
international law which were still in effect at the time.88 All three justices 
addressed the question of the marriage’s validity as a preliminary and 
incidental question. The majority rejected the husband’s interpretation of 
Article 47 as a choice of law rule and held that: 
The provision in Article 47 is a provision of the municipal internal law, 
and does not form an exception to the rule which I have stated: that pri-
vate international law takes precedence in its application over munici-
pal internal law. The provision in Article 47 is also subject to the rules 
of private international law.89 
Once the majority determined that Israeli law lacked a statutory choice of 
law rule for marriage recognition, they referred to Article 46 of the Order 
in Council, which directed the courts to apply English common law in 
the case of a lacuna.90 Given that under English common law, capacity to 
marry was decided based on the couple’s domicile at the time of the cer-
emony, the majority held that the foreign marriage of the Skornik couple 
                                                                                                             
 82. See, e.g., CA 191/51 Skornik v. Skornik 8(1) PD 141 [1954] (Isr.). 
 83. See id. 
 84. See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 85. CA 191/51 Skornik v. Skornik 8(1) PD 141 [1954] (Isr.). 
 86. Id. at 146. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 179. 
 90. Id. 
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should be recognized in Israel since it was valid in Poland.91 In fact, even 
the dissenting justice, Justice Agranat, held that the marriage was valid, 
but unlike his colleagues, he based his ruling on Article 47 of the Order 
in Council, interpreting it as a choice of law rule for marriage recogni-
tion.92 Accordingly, Justice Agranat held that the personal law that 
should be applied to determine the validity of marriages performed out-
side of Israel is the law of the couple’s nationality at the time of the mar-
riage ceremony. 93 Since both spouses were Polish citizens at the relevant 
time, and their marriage was valid according to Polish law, Justice Agra-
nat recognized their marriage as valid in Israel.94 
Relying on the dissenting opinion in the Skornik case, a few Israeli 
scholars claimed that Article 47 should be interpreted as a rule of private 
international law, so that the religious law of Israeli nationals would go-
vern the formal and essential validity of their marriages.95 According to 
these scholars, as long as Jewish religious law prescribes that a Jew can 
be married only in a certain manner, the provision applies to the person 
whether the marriage takes place within the state of Israel or beyond its 
borders.96 This approach, although based upon the interpretation of Ar-
ticle 47 as a choice of law rule, is in fact a pretext for rejecting the appli-
cation of private international law for the recognition of marriages per-
formed by Israeli citizens and residents outside the jurisdiction. Accord-
ing to this interpretation, Israeli domestic law has universal applicability, 
such that the internal system of compulsory religious marriage applies 
also to marriages taking place abroad by Israeli residents and nationals.97 
                                                                                                             
 91. Id. at 161. 
 92. Id. at 166. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 166–67. 
 95. See, e.g., Shava, Civil Marriages Celebrated Abroad, supra note 42, at 319; see 
also A. V. LEVONTIN, ON MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES OUT OF THE JURISDICTION 95 (1957). 
A similar position was expressed by Goadby: “The validity in substance of a marriage 
contracted by Palestinians, whether in Palestine or abroad, depends, it is submitted, upon 
the personal (religious) law of each party. . . . Thus a marriage contracted abroad though 
valid according to the lex loci celebrationis both in form and substance might be held 
invalid in Palestine on the ground that it was substantially unlawful by the religious law 
of one or both of the parties.” FREDERIC M. GOADBY, INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-
RELIGIOUS PRIVATE LAW IN PALESTINE 152 (1926) (first emphasis added). 
 96. See LEVONTIN, supra note 95, at 95, 114. 
 97. The advantage of the position that Jewish religious law should have universal 
application is that it may validate religious marriages performed in countries whose laws 
permit only civil marriage ceremonies. This interpretation has been applied by the Israeli 
courts only in cases where the resort to religious law would validate the foreign marriage; 
however it was not implemented in cases where religious law would invalidate the for-
eign marriage. See CA 5016/91 Shaulian v. Shaulian 49(5) PD 387, 392 [1996] (Isr.). 
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This interpretive approach, which maintains that domestic law (i.e., 
Jewish religious law) should have extra-territorial application in all cir-
cumstances, thus denying the application of private international law, is 
unprecedented and was never adopted by any legal system the world 
over.98 Indeed, the religious tribunals claim that Jewish religious law has 
universal, retroactive, and exclusive application, and completely reject 
the rules of private international law.99 The Israeli civil courts, on the 
other hand, consider the rules of private international law to prevail over 
the application of religious law, and where a foreign element is in-
volved—such as foreign nationality or place of celebration—view the 
rules of domestic law (including religious law) as subordinate to those of 
private international law.100 
Still, on more than one occasion judges in Israel’s lower civil courts 
have held that Article 47 should be interpreted as a choice of law rule so 
that the validity of foreign marriages of Israeli citizens were determined 
in accordance with the laws of their religion.101 Other lower court judges, 
however, have applied the majority opinion in the Skornik case (although 
that case dealt with spouses who were citizens and residents of a foreign 
country at the time of their marriage ceremony), deferring to the English 
choice of law rules in order to verify the validity of marriages between 
spouses who were residents and citizens of Israel at the time the foreign 
                                                                                                             
 98. This approach is in fact akin to the “Lex Fori solution,” which is an alternative to 
private international law. According to the above solution, even where a foreign element 
is involved, the local law must be applied, and foreign law should never be applied. See 
Amos Shapira, Comments on the Nature and Purpose of Private International Law, 10 
IYUNEI MISHPAT 275, 281–83 (1984) (Isr.) [hereinafter Shapira, Comments]. This ap-
proach is informed not only by the assumption of the lex fori’s universal application, but 
also by considerations of convenience and efficiency (among them the familiarity with 
the local law of all parties involved and the difficulty of proving the foreign law), as well 
as considerations of justice and reasonableness (the application of forum’s public policy 
considerations and accepted notions of justice and reasonableness of the local society). 
See id. However it must be emphasized that no legal system in the world has adopted the 
Lex Fori solution in a systematic and comprehensive way. The actual manner in which 
the Lex Fori has been applied, in order to prevent the application of foreign law, is via the 
“public policy” exception. 
 99. See Yitzhak Englard, The Status of Religious Law in Israeli Law, 4 MISHPATIM L. 
REV. 31, 32–33 (1972) (Isr.). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See, e.g., CC (BS) 2400/98 Chernich v. Slotski (Jan. 14, 2001) (unpublished) 
(Isr.); CC (TA) 12181/01 B.B.D. v. B.M.N. (May 15, 2002) (unpublished) (Isr.); CC 
(TA) 713/92 Chiadri v. Chiadri (Mar. 23, 1993), Takdinet Legal Database (by subscrip-
tion) (Isr.). 
2011] CHOICE OF LAW AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN ISRAEL 529 
marriage ceremony took place.102 Accordingly, for a long period of time, 
the controversy regarding the appropriate interpretation of Article 47 was 
not resolved and it remained unclear which choice of law rules should 
apply in cases involving the foreign marriages of Israeli citizens and res-
idents. 
Finally, in 2006, this debate came to an end in the case of A. v. Tel-
Aviv-Jaffa Regional Rabbinical Court (“A. v. The Rabbinical Court”).103 
The case involved a petition for divorce brought by an Israeli Jewish 
couple, who were eligible to marry in Israel according to religious law, 
but decided to marry in a civil ceremony in Cyprus.104 The Supreme 
Court was faced, yet again, with the question of the appropriate interpre-
tation of Article 47. The Court flatly rejected the position that Article 47 
should be interpreted as a choice of law rule and unequivocally adopted 
the position expressed by the Skornik majority.105 Accordingly, the Court 
held that Article 47 is an internal directive regarding the marriage and 
divorce of Israeli citizens within the borders of Israel.106 It thus took 
more than half a century for the obiter dictum of the majority Justices in 
Skornik to become a binding precedent. 
The Supreme Court went on to hold, based on basic principles of pri-
vate international law, that a distinction must be made between the for-
mal validity of a marriage and the capacity of the parties to marry.107 It 
classified the nature of the marriage ceremony—whether religious or 
civil—as part of the question of form, properly governed by the law of 
the place of celebration, the lex loci celebrationis.108 As far as essential 
validity is concerned, the Court held only that foreign marriages of 
couples eligible to marry in Israel are recognized according to the Eng-
lish rules of private international law, refraining from deciding whether 
this rule applies to foreign marriages of couples who lack capacity under 
religious law.109 
Given the rejection of the interpretation of Article 47 as a choice of 
law rule, and in light of the limited scope of the precedent set in A. v. The 
Rabbinical Court, the question of which choice of law rule applies to 
                                                                                                             
 102. See, e.g., CC (Jer) 2/85 Kleidman v. Kleidman, PM 5747(b) 377 (1987) (Isr.). For 
an explanation of English choice of law rules in this context, see discussion infra Part 
IV.B. 
 103. HCJ 2232/03 A. v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Regional Rabbinical Court (2) IsrLR 245 
[2006]. 
 104. Id. ¶ 1. 
 105. Id. ¶ 26. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. ¶ 24. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. ¶ 26. 
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foreign marriages of Israeli residents and citizens prevented from marry-
ing in Israel under religious law, including same-sex couples, became a 
lacuna. It is unclear whether the courts, when faced with this issue, will 
fill the void by resort to the English rules of private international law, or 
whether they will consider adopting choice of law rules practiced in oth-
er jurisdictions as well. Some of the English rules of private international 
law were incorporated into Israeli law in the past via Article 46, which 
stipulated that Israeli courts were directed to apply the English common 
law as the main source for filling the gaps in Israeli law.110 For instance, 
the majority in the 1954 Skornik case applied Article 46 and deferred to 
the English rules of private international law.111 
Indeed, in the past, by virtue of Article 46, courts usually filled the gap 
created by the absence of statutory or judge-made private international 
law rules in the Israeli legal system by deferring to English common 
law.112 Nonetheless, in 1980 the legislature repealed this Article, which 
had been the formal channel for the absorption of English law since the 
initiation of Israel, through the passage of the Foundations of Law Act.113 
Since 1980, the Act instructs the courts to fill in lacunae by case law, 
analogy and “the principles of freedom, justice, equity and peace of 
Israel’s heritage.”114 Thus, although Israeli courts are no longer obligated 
to apply English law in cases of lacunae, they are still permitted to draw 
analogies from English or, since 1980, any other foreign case law.115 
The Supreme Court’s holding in A. v. The Rabbinical Court, recogniz-
ing the marriage under examination in accordance with the English rules 
of private international law, was limited to the circumstances of that 
case—Jewish spouses eligible for marriage under religious law who mar-
ried abroad.116 In that scenario, the decision of which choice of law rule 
to apply bore no significance to the outcome—each rule led to recogni-
tion of the foreign marriage. For this reason, the Supreme Court did not 
see fit to construct a new choice of law rule for marriage recognition, and 
                                                                                                             
 110. Palestine Order in Council, 1922, art. 46, in 2 LAWS OF PALESTINE 431 (Moses 
Doukhan ed., 1934). 
 111. CA 191/51 Skornik v. Skornik 8(1) PD 141, 160–61, 180 [1954] (Isr.). 
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 114. Id. § 1; see also Rhona Schuz, Private International Law at the End of the Twen-
tieth Century: Progress or Regress?, in ISRAELI REPORTS TO THE XV INTERNATIONAL 
CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 145, 152 & n.18 (Alfredo Mordechai Rabello ed., 
1999). 
 115. See Barak, supra note 112. 
 116. See HCJ 2232/03 A. v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Regional Rabbinical Court (2) IsrLR 245 
[2006]. 
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sufficed with referring to the rule that had applied to the issue in the past 
(by virtue of Article 46), declining to decide which choice of law rule 
should apply in other circumstances.117 This case was an “easy” one, as 
the parties were both eligible for marriage in Israel according to Jewish 
religious law and since even the Rabbinical Court was willing to recog-
nize the validity of their foreign civil marriage for certain purposes.118 
The question of the applicable choice of law rule for marriage recogni-
tion will arise at its full intensity once the courts are faced with a case 
involving spouses who are ineligible for marriage in Israel, particularly 
same-sex couples. When this question arises, it would be inappropriate 
for the Israeli courts to mechanically apply the English rules of private 
international law. Instead, the courts should be at liberty to select the 
choice of law rule most appropriate for marriage recognition in Israel. 
Indeed, Israeli courts increasingly tend to compare the English and 
American choice of law rules and adopt the more suitable rule among the 
two.119 
IV. DETERMINING THE PROPER CHOICE OF LAW RULE FOR THE 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES 
A. Policy Objectives of the Choice of Law Rules for Marriage Recogni-
tion 
In investigating the most appropriate choice of law rule for ruling on 
the validity of civil marriages conducted abroad by Israeli citizens and 
residents who are ineligible for religious marriage, including same-sex 
couples, it is important to first examine the policy objectives which 
choice of law rules in the field of marriage recognition should seek to 
achieve. These findings enable a subsequent examination of the rules that 
promote the aforementioned interests in the most fitting manner.120 
                                                                                                             
 117. Id. ¶ 26. 
 118. The Rabbinical Court stated that Jewish law recognizes such marriages as valid 
only vis-à-vis third parties, but not in terms of the mutual obligations of the parties. See 
id. ¶ 8–9. 
 119. Schuz, supra note 114, at 153 n.20 (citing CA 2705/91 Abu Jechlah v. E. Jerusa-
lem Elec. Co. 48(3) PD 554 [1993]; CA 750/79 Klausner v. Berkovits 37(4) PD 449 
[1983]). 
 120. In addition to the two principal systems for marriage recognition in the conflict of 
laws, which are the main focus of this Article (the personal law system versus the prin-
ciple of lex loci celebrationis), there are additional, less common approaches that serve as 
alternatives to the prevailing choice of law rules, including the lex fori approach and “the 
proper law” approach, which allows the court to weigh up all the relevant connections 
instead of being bound to give precedence to a particular connection. For an overview of 
the various approaches, see MICHAEL KARAYANNI, THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHOICE OF 
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Within the context of formulating choice of law rules, modern private 
international law aspires to configure rules that arrive at a just result121 
and which attribute considerable weight to general policy considera-
tions.122 There are five principal policy objectives which choice of law 
rules in the field of marriage recognition should seek to advance.123 
(1) The presumption in favor of the validity of marriage: The funda-
mental policy of private international law in the field of marriage rec-
ognition is the principle of validating foreign marriages in order to pre-
serve family ties and to give effect to the parties’ intention to create a 
binding marital bond.124 According to this principle, preference should 
be given to choice of law rules that would validate the marriage over 
rules that would lead to non-recognition of the foreign status.125 
                                                                                                             
LAW PROCESS ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 46–58 (2002). These approaches were 
harshly criticized and it appears that they do not promote, in any meaningful way, the 
policy objectives that choice of law rules for marriage recognition should seek to pro-
mote. 
 121. Id. at 233. 
 122. HCJ 5666/03 Amutat Kav la-Oved v. Nat’l Labor Court in Jerusalem, ¶ 18 [Oct. 
10, 2007] (Rivlin, J.) (unpublished) (Isr.). 
 123. The following list is based primarily on T.C. Hartley, The Policy Basis of the 
English Conflict of Laws of Marriage, 35 MOD. L. REV. 571, 571–73 (1972); see also 
Alan Reed, Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and De-
pecage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 387, 
388–90 (2000). Most of the policy objectives mentioned in this list also appear as factors 
to be considered in choice of law proceedings under Section 6 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws (including the interest in protecting the expectations of the 
parties, as well as considerations of certainty and uniformity). See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). 
 124. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT 
OF LAWS 402 (rev. 3d ed. 2003). The fundamental principle of private international law 
according to which marriages valid in the place of celebration should, wherever possible, 
be held valid everywhere, was also recognized in Israeli jurisprudence. See, e.g., CA 
191/51 Skornik v. Skornik 8(1) PD 141, 178 [1954] (Isr.) (“If . . . we follow this course, 
and lay down the law in these terms, we shall also remain faithful to the principle—a 
widely-accepted principle in this branch of the law—that it is the duty of the judge who 
investigates the question of the validity of a marriage to do his best, so far as the law 
enables him so to do, to hold a marriage valid, and not invalid.”). 
 125. Hartley, supra note 123, at 572. Another interest that may be relevant in this con-
text is the interest in universal recognition of vested rights. See Shapira, Comments, supra 
note 98, at 283–84. It should be noted, however, that the “vested rights theory” is quite 
controversial and its influence is gradually diminishing. See Kurt Siehr, A Statute on 
Private International Law for Israel, in ISRAEL AMONG THE NATIONS 353, 357–58 (Alfred 
E. Kellermann, Kurt Siehr & Talia Einhorn eds. 1998). That said, and despite the erosion 
of the “vested rights theory,” it appears that in the field of family law (as opposed to other 
legal fields, such as contracts and torts) the protection of vested rights is still a relevant 
and important consideration. 
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(2) The protection of the reasonable expectations of the parties: It 
would be unjust to breach the expectations of the parties by deferring to 
a law that the parties could not reasonably have contemplated—
particularly so when the parties reasonably relied on the application of 
a certain law and conducted their lives accordingly.126 
(3) Convenience, Simplicity and Efficiency: These considerations typi-
cally support the application of the forum law with which the parties 
involved are most familiar.127 
(4) Certainty, Stability and Uniformity: “[P]arties should know [with 
certainty], or be able to ascertain, without the necessity of litigation, the 
applicable law.”128 According to these considerations, choice of law 
principles should be clear, definite, and absent of any element of ambi-
guity or flexibility.129 Likewise, choice of law rules should seek to 
promote the international uniformity of status as much as possible and 
thereby promote legal stability and certainty.130 Consequently, it would 
not be fitting to apply the law of the forum where it is likely to lead to 
“limping” marriages.131 
(5) Comity and International Cooperation: For reasons of comity and 
state interest in international relations,132 the choice of law rules of the 
forum should give due regard to the interests of a foreign country and 
give effect to its judgments and administrative decisions.133 In order to 
encourage international cooperation, a choice of law rule that promotes 
these interests is preferable.134 
                                                                                                             
 126. Reed, supra note 123, at 388–89; Hartley, supra note 123, at 571–72. 
 127. See Hartley, supra note 123, at 571. The application of foreign law is liable to be 
complex and complicated, as foreign law is considered a “fact” that typically requires 
proof by experts. Id. The requirement of proving foreign law could thus prolong the pro-
ceedings and cause uncertainty. Id. 
 128. Reed, supra note 123, at 389. 
 129. See id. 
 130. The best way to promote the uniformity of status is to apply the choice of law 
rules that have earned wide international recognition. See Hartley, supra note 123, at 572. 
On the importance of the uniformity of status, see Henderson v. Henderson, 87 A.2d 403, 
408 (Md. 1952); Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1054 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990). 
 131. See Reed, supra note 123, at 390. 
 132. See Societé Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court S. Dist. Iowa, 
482 U.S. 522, 543 n. 27 (1987) (“Comity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a 
domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of 
other sovereign states”); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (“‘Comi-
ty,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of 
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.”). 
 133. See Hartley, supra note 123, at 572–73. 
 134. Schuz, supra note 114, at 147. 
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In order to formulate an appropriate choice of law rule, an attempt 
must be made, to the extent possible, to advance all of the above goals.135 
It is doubtful whether it is possible to formulate a single choice of law 
rule that will fully promote all of the interests, though, as some of the 
policy considerations are likely to conflict with one another and each 
may lead to the adoption of a different choice of law rule. Such is the 
case, for instance, regarding the considerations of certainty, uniformity 
and international cooperation (policies 4 and 5 above), which normally 
would point to the application of the foreign law, whereas considerations 
of convenience and efficiency (policy 3 above) usually weigh in favor of 
domestic law.136 
Choice of law rules in the field of marriage recognition can thus be de-
signed to promote a number of goals that are not necessarily consistent 
with one another. The relative weight given to each of the interests and 
the balance between them is likely to vary from one legal system to 
another. Indeed, as is further elaborated below, the emphasis on different 
rationales and policy considerations has led to the formulation of two 
distinct systems for marriage recognition. 
B. The Personal Law System vs. The Principle of Lex Loci Celebrationis 
It is customary to distinguish, for purposes of marriage recognition, be-
tween the formal validity (“marriage formalities”) and the essential va-
lidity of the marriage (“marriage essentials”).137 Although the nature and 
scope of the requirements that are considered “marriage formalities” may 
vary from one country to another, the term usually refers to the legal suf-
ficiency of the ceremony itself as well as the “related procedures re-
quired for the valid celebration of a marriage,” including the need for 
license and witnesses, registration requirements, and the like.138 All of 
the requirements to which the parties must adhere in terms of their legal 
capacity to marry each other, such as minimum age and lack of affinity, 
belong to the “marriage essentials” category.139 As far as the form of 
                                                                                                             
 135. See Reed, supra note 123, at 391. 
 136. Hartley, supra note 123, at 573. 
 137. LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY 
LAW 216 (2002). 
 138. Reed, supra note 123, at 392; see also P. M. NORTH & J. J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE 
AND NORTH’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 572–86 (12th ed. 1992). 
 139. See PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 
164. Certain countries “subdivide essentials into categories that distinguish between de-
fects that render a marriage void ab initio and those which render the marriage merely 
voidable . . . .” Lynn D. Wardle, International Marriage and Divorce Regulation and 
Recognition: A Survey, 29 FAM. L.Q. 497, 500 (1995) [hereinafter Wardle, International 
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marriage is concerned, the universally accepted rule of conflicts is that 
all aspects of formal validity are governed by the lex loci celebratio-
nis.140 As to the substantive conditions of marriage, there are two prevail-
ing choice of law rules: the personal law of the parties and the law of the 
place of celebration.141 
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, English courts drew no dis-
tinction between the formal and the essential validity of foreign marriag-
es, holding that in both aspects the validity of a marriage depended on 
the lex loci celebrationis.142 The basic concept held by the English courts 
up to that time was that marriages valid where celebrated are valid eve-
rywhere, subject to the requirement that the marriage did not violate the 
public policy of the forum.143 Since some of the marital prohibitions im-
posed by English law during the nineteenth century were stricter than 
those imposed by neighboring European countries, English couples who 
lacked capacity to marry often attempted to evade the local prohibition 
by marrying on a brief trip abroad and then returning to England.144 As 
the choice of law rule simply referred to the lex loci celebrationis, such 
marriages were routinely validated.145 However, in the 1861 case of 
                                                                                                             
Marriage]. While “[e]ssentials are necessary for a valid marriage [and the] violation of 
those . . . prohibitions . . . may . . . render the marriage invalid, . . . . [f]ormalities are 
legal requirements the violation of which may be punished, but generally will not affect 
the validity of the marriage.” Id. 
 140. LENNART PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
173 (1974) [hereinafter PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS]; see also NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 138, at 572 (“There is no rule more firm-
ly established in private international law than that which applies the maxim locus regit 
actum to the formalities of a marriage, i.e. that an act is governed by the [law of the] 
place where it is done.”). 
 141. See PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 
89. “The personal law system includes two different rules for determining personal law: 
[one is] lex patriae (the law of one’s nationality) and [the other is the] lex domicilii (the 
law of one’s domicile). Lex patriae . . . is the traditional choice of law rule for marriage 
recognition in most of Continental Europe,” while lex domicilii “is the choice of law rule 
for marriage recognition in England, in many commonwealth countries, and in some 
Latin American countries.” See WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 137, at 216–17. 
 142. PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 13 & 
n.22; see also J. H. Beale, Jr., The Law of Capacity in International Marriages, 15 
HARV. L. REV. 382, 385–86 (1902). 
 143. See J.H.C. MORRIS, DAVID MCCLEAN & KISCH BEEVERS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
55, 200 (7th ed. 2009). 
 144. See id. at 213; Wendy A. Adams, Same-Sex Relationships and Anglo-American 
Choice of Law: An Argument for Universal Validity, 34 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 103, 111 
(1996). 
 145. See Adams, supra note 144, at 110–11. For instance, English couples frequently 
evaded “the provisions of Lord Hardwicke’s Marriage Act, 1753, which required parental 
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Brook v. Brook,146 the House of Lords, wishing to prevent further at-
tempts to evade domestic prohibitions, decided to draw a distinction be-
tween capacity and form, and held that while the form is to be governed 
by the lex loci celebrationis, capacity should be governed by the law of 
the domicile.147 
The case concerned “a man and his deceased wife’s sister, both . . . 
domiciled in England,” who attempted to evade the domestic prohibition 
on their marriage by performing the ceremony in Denmark, which al-
lowed such marriages.148 Based on the aforementioned distinction, since 
the parties lacked capacity to marry each other under English law, the 
House of Lords denied recognition of the marriage.149 Since the Brook 
court did not specify the exact manner in which the parties’ domicile 
should be determined, English courts developed three distinct theories to 
that effect: the intended matrimonial home theory (attributed to Che-
shire),150 the most real and substantial connection theory,151 and the dual 
                                                                                                             
consent for underage marriages, by marrying in Scotland where consent was not re-
quired.” Id. at 111. Upon their return to England, their marriages were usually recog-
nized. Id.; see, e.g., Middleton v. Janverin, (1802) 161 Eng. Rep. 797, 799; 2 Hag. Con. 
437, 443–44 & 444 n. (discussing Compton v. Bearcroft (Ct. Del. 1769) (Eng.)); Simonin 
v. Mallac, (1860) 164 Eng. Rep. 917, 924; 2 Sw. & Tr. 67, 83 (“Compton v. Bearcroft is 
therefore an authority to this extent, that a marriage contracted by English domiciled 
subjects abroad, where it is not prohibited by English law, will not be held bad because 
the parties have gone thither to evade the necessity of complying with certain conditions 
that would have been imposed upon them in England.”). 
 146. Brook v. Brook, (1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 703; 9 H.L. Cas. 193. 
 147. See id. at 710; 9 H.L. Cas. at 207–08; see also Sottomayor v. De Barros, [1877] 3 
P.D. 1 at 5 (Eng.) (“The law of a country where a marriage is solemnized must alone 
decide all questions relating to the validity of the ceremony by which the marriage is 
alleged to have been constituted; but, as in other contracts, so in that of marriage, person-
al capacity must depend on the law of domicile . . . .”). 
 148. Adams, supra note 144, at 111–12. Marriages between relatives of such affinity 
were prohibited at the time in England by virtue of “Lord Lyndhurst’s Marriage Act, 
1835, [which] rendered void a marriage between persons within prohibited degrees of 
consanguinity and affinity that were stricter than those in other European countries.” Id. 
at 111. Only in 1907 did England enact a special law allowing such marriages (the De-
ceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act of 1907). See MORRIS, MCCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra 
note 143, at 214 & n.90. 
 149. See Brook, 11 Eng. Rep. at 705; 9 H.L. Cas. at 193. 
 150. See Reed, supra note 123, at 396–400. According to this theory, “the parties’ 
capacity to marry is determined by the law of their intended matrimonial [domicile].” Id. 
at 396. Although the intended matrimonial home test has some advantages (such as the 
promotion of the validity of marriages), it is “inherently uncertain,” and its prospective 
nature renders it impractical. See id. at 397–98. 
 151. See id. at 400–02. This theory directs courts to the legal system “that has the most 
real and substantial connection with the marriage” and it “allows consideration of a mul-
tiplicity of relevant factors embracing domicile, nationality, residence, . . . and place of 
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domicile theory (attributed to Dicey).152 This last theory is the one most 
commonly applied by the English courts.153 
Seemingly, the main argument in support of applying the personal law 
(whether determined by domicile or by nationality154) in matters of ca-
pacity is that questions of status should be the concern of the country in 
which a person’s life is centered.155 According to this approach, the 
country holding the most significant interest in determining the substan-
tive conditions for creating a valid marriage is the one to which the par-
ties hold the most substantial connections.156 The House of Lords in 
                                                                                                             
[celebration].” Id. at 400. However, it is a “vague and unpredictable test” that is difficult 
to apply. Id. at 402 (internal quotation omitted). 
 152. See id. at 393–96. According to the dual domicile theory, “[c]apacity to marry is 
governed by the law of the parties’ ante-nuptial domiciles: each party must have capacity 
[to marry], according to the law of his or her domicile at the time of the ceremony, to 
marry the other.” Id. at 393. The “primary justification [for this theory] is that it promotes 
certainty” and that “a person’s status is a matter of public concern to the country to which 
he belongs at the time of marriage . . . .” Id. at 394. However, as Reed points out, this 
approach “runs counter to the policy objective of presuming in favor of upholding the 
validity of a marriage” since: “The cumulative nature of the test, looking at both parties’ 
ante-nuptial domiciliary laws, greatly increases the likelihood of the marriage being de-
clared invalid, than if a single determinative law were applied.” Id. at 395. 
 153. M.D.A. Freeman, Marriage and Divorce in England, 29 FAM. L.Q. 549, 561 
(1995). 
 154. In the Continent it is also customary to distinguish between form and capacity to 
marry, and to apply the law of the place of celebration in matters of form. However, un-
like English law, which refers to domicile in matters of capacity, the customary choice of 
law rule in the Continent refers to the law of the couple’s nationality. See PÅLSSON, 
MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 89–91. 
 155. See, e.g., Pugh v. Pugh, [1951] P. 482 at 491 (Eng.) (“It must be remembered that 
personal status and capacity to marry are considered to be the concern of the country of 
domicile.”). 
 156. PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 93. 
From this perspective it seems that the personal law system referring to the domicile of 
the parties is preferable to that which refers to their nationality. Indeed, the current trend 
in private international law is to use domicile rather than nationality (especially in immi-
gration states). On this topic, see Michael Bogdan & Eva Ryrstedt, Marriage in Swedish 
Family Law and Swedish Conflicts of Law, 29 FAM. L.Q. 675, 679–80 (1995). The most 
widely used connecting factor in Israeli statutory choice of law rules is domicile, espe-
cially in the field of personal status. For example, the law of the common domicile of the 
parties is the primary connecting factor under both Section 5 of the Dissolution of Mar-
riage (Jurisdiction in Special Cases) Law and Section 17(a) of the Family Law Amend-
ment (Maintenance) Law. See Matters of Dissolution of Marriage (Jurisdiction in Special 
Cases) Law, 5729–1969, 23 LSI 274, § 5 (1968–1969) (Isr.); Family Law Amendment 
(Maintenance) Law, 5719–1959, 13 LSI 73, § 17(a) (1958–1959) (Isr.); see also Spouses 
(Property Relations) Law, 5733–1973, 27 LSI 313, § 15 (1972–1973) (Isr.); Capacity and 
Guardianship Law, 5722–1962, 16 LSI 106, § 77 (1961–1962) (Isr.). 
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Brook v. Brook157 based its use of domicile as determinant of the parties’ 
capacity on the concept that the law of the country with which the parties 
are most connected at the time of the ceremony should apply in all mat-
ters vital to the preservation of the fundamental features of its marriage 
institution, and that the parties should not be allowed to evade any prohi-
bitions imposed by their domicile’s law.158 In the words of the House of 
Lords: 
There can be no doubt of the general rule, that ‘a foreign marriage, va-
lid according to the law of a country where it is celebrated[,] is good 
everywhere.’ But while the forms of entering into the contract of mar-
riage are to be regulated by the lex loci contractus, the law of the coun-
try in which it is celebrated, the essentials of the marriage depend upon 
the lex domicilii, the law of the country in which the parties are domi-
ciled at the time of the marriage, and in which the matrimonial resi-
dence is contemplated. Although the forms of celebrating the foreign 
marriage may be different from those required by the law of the coun-
try of domicile, the marriage may be good everywhere. But if the con-
tract of marriage is such, in essentials, as to be contrary to the law of 
the country of domicile, and it is declared void by that law, it is to be 
regarded as void in the country of domicile, though not contrary to the 
law of the country in which it was celebrated.159 
As indicated by the decision in Brook, the consideration that lies at the 
heart of the English choice of law system, as far as marriage recognition 
is concerned, is that the country of domicile bears the most significant 
interest in setting the essential conditions required to create a valid mar-
riage, even when the ceremony is performed in a foreign country in ac-
cordance with that county’s laws.160 
The decision of the House of Lords to abandon the principle of lex loci 
celebrationis with respect to the parties’ capacity to marry was harshly 
criticized, and rightfully so. Professor Beale, for one, called the decision 
“an ignorant error.”161 Justice Sussman of the Israeli Supreme Court con-
curred with Beale’s critique,162 and added: 
                                                                                                             
 157. Brook v. Brook, (1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 703; 9 H.L. Cas. 193. 
 158. See C. M. V. Clarkson, Marriage in England: Favouring the Lex Fori, 10 LEGAL 
STUD. 80, 81 (1990). 
 159. Brook, 11 Eng. Rep. at 710; 9 H.L. Cas. at 207–08. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Beale, supra note 142, at 386. The decision to apply the law of domicile in mat-
ters of capacity was criticized by the lower courts in England as well. See, e.g., Sotto-
mayor v. De Barros, [1879] 5 P.D. 94 at 100 (Eng.) (“But I trust that I may be permitted 
without disrespect to say that the doctrine thus laid down has not hitherto been ‘well rec-
ognized.’ On the contrary, it appears to me to be a novel principle, for which up to the 
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When the Israeli court decides to elect a choice of law rule [for mar-
riage recognition], we will not necessarily adopt the English rule. In-
deed, as for myself, I see no obligation to rectify an English precedent 
which even if born by mistake, is now accepted law in England . . . . 
Should the English rule meet our needs, we will accept it as law in 
Israel. However, it is possible that the American rule will be deemed 
more appropriate.163 
Indeed, the English choice of law rule for marriage recognition, as 
formulated by the Brook court, is inconsistent and incoherent. The rule 
does not make a distinction between couples domiciled in England at the 
time of their foreign marriage and couples who had married while domi-
ciled in a foreign country and later immigrated to England. Since the 
prevalent approach is that capacity to marry is governed by the law of the 
parties’ domicile at the time of the ceremony (the dual domicile theory), 
marriages of couples who immigrate to England following their wedding 
ceremony are commonly recognized (subject to public policy considera-
tions), even though the marriage would have been prohibited under Eng-
lish law. The rule validates these marriages even though England is the 
country with which the parties have the most connections during their 
marriage. This flaw reveals that the rule for marriage essentials was noth-
ing more than a disguised prohibition of evasion.164 The main concern of 
the court in Brook was not with the formulation of a coherent choice of 
law rule for marriage recognition, but rather with halting attempts to 
evade the English marital restrictions.165 While preventing evasion “may 
be a valid concern,” it is immaterial as an “underlying rationale” for 
choice of law rules.166 
Moreover, the English rule was designed to promote social, cultural 
and moral interests that embody the forum’s fundamental concept of its 
marriage institution, and as such, to give effect to domestic prohibitions 
placed on certain types of marriages, such as incestuous marriages, mar-
                                                                                                             
present time there has been no English authority. What authority there is seems to me to 
be the other way.”). 
 162. HCJ 143/62 Funk-Schlesinger v. Minister of Interior 17(1) PD 225, 254 [1963] 
(Isr.). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Adams, supra note 144, at 113. 
 165. As the Brook court stated: “It is quite obvious that no civilised state can allow its 
domiciled subjects or citizens, by making a temporary visit to a foreign country to enter 
into a contract to be performed in the place of domicile, if the contract is forbidden by the 
law of the place of domicile as contrary to religion, or morality, or to any of its funda-
mental institutions.” Brook, 11 Eng. Rep. at 712; 9 H.L. Cas. at 212. 
 166. Adams, supra note 144, at 114. 
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riages of minors, and the like.167 Without minimizing the significance of 
the forum’s public interests (which reflect its “internal” public policy168), 
these considerations should not play a part in the formulation of choice 
of law rules for marriage recognition. Such rules should be designed ac-
cording to the fundamental principles of private international law, and 
local public interests, including the interest in preventing evasion, should 
be taken into consideration only within the context of an “external” pub-
lic policy exception.169 The limitations imposed on the parties’ capacity 
to marry are a clear matter of “internal” public policy, and where a for-
eign element is involved, it is fitting that limitations be examined within 
the framework of the exception expressly designed for that purpose.170 
By virtue of the public policy exception, the court is authorized to deny 
recognition of marriages that are inconsistent with the core social, cultur-
al, and moral values of the forum. Although the public policy exception 
is also recognized under English law,171 the court in Brook (as well as 
subsequent case law) did not even consider the option to invoke it in or-
der to deny recognition of the marriage in question.172 
In addition to the aforementioned weaknesses, the most significant dis-
advantage of the English rule for marriage recognition is that it com-
pletely bars—without leaving any discretion to the court—the option of 
recognizing a marriage that was conducted in violation of any of the re-
quirements for marriage capacity prescribed by the law of the parties’ 
domicile. The court is denied any discretion to consider the seriousness 
                                                                                                             
 167. Based on the English case law, there are scholars who also classify moral, reli-
gious, and cultural considerations as part of policy objectives which choice of law rules 
in the field of marriage recognition should seek to achieve. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 
123, at 387–90; see also Hartley, supra note 123, at 571–72. 
 168. For a discussion of the distinction in private international law between “internal” 
public policy and “external” public policy, see infra Part V.A. 
 169. Id. 
 170. According to Kurt Siehr: “The preference of domestic law over foreign law is a 
coloured one, tainted by prejudice, habit and other human frailties. In conflicts law one 
must get rid of them. Conflicts law does not need to defend domestic law against foreign 
intrusions . . . . If foreign law violates basic values of domestic law, the general clause of 
public policy assures that such a law will not be applied in domestic courts.” Siehr, supra 
note 125, at 364. 
 171. NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 138, at 128. 
 172. Had the court in Brook applied the law of the place of celebration to the issue of 
capacity (as it was applied to the formalities of the marriage), it could have invalidated 
the marriage as contrary to external English public policy. Once the House of Lords had 
elected to adopt a choice of law rule which refers to the parties’ domicile in matters of 
capacity, see Brook v. Brook, (1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 703; 9 H.L. Cas. 193, the invocation 
of the English public policy exception became relevant only in instances where the par-
ties were domiciled in a foreign country at the time of the marriage. 
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of the breach of the relevant norm under the circumstances of the case, 
the differences between the various restrictions laid down by the laws of 
the forum, the different rationales the restrictions are based on, and the 
degree of the necessity of each of them for the preservation of the fun-
damental values of the forum’s marriage institution. Moreover, the per-
sonal law system does not place adequate weight on the interests of vali-
dating foreign marriages, protecting the parties’ expectations, and pro-
moting uniformity of status and international cooperation. 
The view held by the legal systems that have adopted the lex loci cele-
brationis as their choice of law rule for marriage essentials, and particu-
larly by the US legal system, is utterly different. The United States has 
always maintained the original English rule for marriage recognition, 
whereby a marriage was held to be governed in its entirety by the lex loci 
celebrationis.173 Accordingly, courts in the United States (and in other 
countries that have adopted the same rule)174 apply only one choice of 
law rule in terms of both form and substance.175 The lex loci celebratio-
nis rule normally ensures that a marriage valid where entered into will be 
held valid in the forum as well.176 
In the United States, the rule as reflected in the Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws177 is subject to two main exceptions: the public poli-
                                                                                                             
 173. See PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 
supra note 140, at 23. 
 174. Other countries that follow the place of celebration rule include the Scandinavian 
countries, the Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, Australia, and most of the Latin Ameri-
can countries. See PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 
56, at 4; HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., THE HAGUE MARRIAGE CONVENTION 2 
(2007), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/outline26e.pdf. 
 175. PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 4. It 
should be noted in this context that the American conflict law on marriage has evolved 
predominately on the basis of interstate, rather than international conflicts situations. Id. 
That said, the same rules that were developed in the context of interstate recognition are 
usually also applicable in the context of the recognition of marriages performed in for-
eign countries. D. MARIANNE BLAIR & MERLE H. WEINER, FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD 
COMMUNITY 371 (2003); PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS, supra note 140, at 23. 
 176. See Ferret v. Ferret, 237 P.2d 594, 602 (N.M. 1951); In re May’s Estate, 114 
N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953); Henderson v. Henderson, 87 A.2d 403, 408 (Md. 1952); Sutton 
v. Warren, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 451, 452 (1845). Various states within the United States 
codified this rule. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-1-4 (West 1978) (stipulating that: “All 
marriages celebrated beyond the limits of this state, which are valid according to the laws 
of the country wherein they were celebrated or contracted, shall be likewise valid in this 
state, and shall have the same force as if they had been celebrated in accordance with the 
laws in force in this state.”). 
 177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971). 
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cy doctrine and evasion statutes.178 These exceptions are based on the 
view that the state where the parties are domiciled, referred to as “the 
state of the most significant relationship,” is “[t]he state primarily con-
cerned [with] the existence of the marital status.”179 When these excep-
tions are implicated in a case, the court applies the law of the forum, 
which invalidates the foreign marriage. However, these exceptions have 
been narrowly interpreted and the interest in upholding foreign marriages 
usually prevails.180 The most prominent feature of the United States con-
flict law in the field of marriage recognition is the policy of validation, 
thus, exceptions that prevent recognition are applied only under rare cir-
cumstances.181 
It appears that the place of celebration principle for both form and ca-
pacity, which promotes the policy of validating marriages, is increasingly 
preferred over the personal law system in private international law.182 
For instance, the Hague Convention on Celebration and Recognition of 
the Validity of Marriages of 1978 stipulates the lex loci celebrationis as 
                                                                                                             
 178. For a discussion of the public policy exception, see infra Part V. Marriage eva-
sion statutes exist today in thirteen states in the United States. Andrew Koppelman, 
Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 923 & n.2 
(1998). According to these laws, “marriages of persons who travel elsewhere in order to 
avoid their home state’s marriage restrictions” are declared void. Id. at 923. For instance, 
the law in Arizona stipulates that: “Parties residing in this state may not evade the laws of 
this state relating to marriage by going to another state or country for solemnization of 
the marriage.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25–112(C) (1956). However, the exception was 
interpreted quite narrowly, and in most cases United States courts refrained from apply-
ing evasion statutes and upheld the marriage in reliance on the lex loci celebrationis. 
PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 29. “The 
prevailing view [of the courts] . . . is that . . . evasion . . . is immaterial in determining the 
validity of the marriage and does not change the operation of the usual conflicts rule . . . . 
[Thus, e]ven in the minority of cases where an evasionary marriage was struck down, . . . 
. [the main reason for not recognizing the marriage was] that the domiciliary prohibition 
was based on a strong public policy, which would in itself . . . have been sufficient to 
compel invalidation of the marriage.” Id.; see also Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage 
and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return 
Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1074–82 (1994); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, 
Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 
1969–70 (1997). 
 179. See PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 
8. 
 180. See id. at 8–9. 
 181. Id. Even in personal law countries the public policy exception is usually inter-
preted quite narrowly. See, e.g., NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 138, at 128–29. 
 182. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 52, at 548 n.2. 
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the choice of law rule in terms of both form and capacity.183 Article 9 of 
that Convention states: “A marriage validly entered into under the law of 
the State of celebration or which subsequently becomes valid under that 
law shall be considered as such in all Contracting States, subject to the 
provisions of this Chapter.”184 
Nonetheless, the place of celebration rule is not without its disadvan-
tages. First, the rule may allow the parties to evade various marriage im-
pediments imposed by their personal law, which reflect the values of the 
community to which they belong, simply by taking a short trip to another 
country for the mere purpose of getting married.185 Second, the place of 
celebration might be completely random, and the parties may lack any 
connection to it whatsoever. When “the parties do not intend to establish 
their matrimonial home in the country in which they marry, the interest 
of that country in their marital status is merely [temporary, whereas] . . . . 
the interests of the country with which the parties are more permanently 
connected, whether by domicile or by nationality,” should bear much 
heavier weight.186 
In sum, the main disadvantage of the lex loci celebrationis as a choice 
of law rule with respect to the parties’ capacity to marry is that it does 
not adequately address the interests of the country in which the spouses 
conduct their lives. However, this disadvantage could be adequately ad-
dressed with a public policy exception that serves to protect and sustain 
the vital public interests of the forum. The application of the lex loci cel-
ebrationis rule does not necessarily lead to the recognition of marriages 
                                                                                                             
 183. Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages, art. 2–3, 
Mar. 14, 1978, 1901 U.N.T.S. 131 [hereinafter Convention on Marriages]. Thus far six 
countries (Australia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Egypt, Finland, and Portugal) have 
signed the Convention, but only three of them (Australia, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands) have incorporated it into their domestic legislation. See Status Table, HAGUE 
CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=88 (last visited Jan. 16, 2011). 
 184. Convention on Marriages, supra note 183, art. 9. The Israeli legislature has also 
adopted the law of the place of celebration as the choice of law rule in a number of sta-
tutes, and has thus recognized (for limited purposes) civil marriages conducted outside of 
Israel and valid according to the law of the place of celebration. See Penal Law, 5737–
1977, Special Volume LSI 55, § 178(1) (1977) (Isr.) (stipulating the applicable choice of 
law rule for establishing the crime of polygamy); see also Matters of Dissolution of Mar-
riage (Jurisdiction in Special Cases) Law, 5729–1969, 23 LSI 274, § 5(a)(4) (1968–1969) 
(Isr.). 
 185. For a discussion of this argument as a reason to reject the place of celebration 
rule, see Menashe Shava, The Nature and Scope of Jewish Law in Israel as Applied in the 
Civil Courts as Compared with its Application in the Rabbinical Courts, 5 JEWISH L. 
ANN. 3, 19–20 (1985). 
 186. PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 5. 
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that stand in contrast with the fundamental values of the forum. As dis-
cussed infra in Part V, by virtue of the external public policy doctrine, 
even legal systems that employ the lex loci celebrationis for marriage 
essentials may opt not to recognize foreign marriages valid in the place 
of celebration when the marriage is of residents who are ineligible to 
marry according to their personal law. 
Moreover, the considerable advantages of the place of celebration rule 
clearly outweigh its weaknesses. In contrast to the personal law system, 
the principle of lex loci celebrationis properly promotes the chief policy 
objectives which choice of law rules in the field of marriage recognition 
should seek to achieve. The rule promotes, first and foremost, the focal 
policy of validating marriages. It is consistent with the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties. The considerations of convenience, simplicity, and 
efficiency also support the adoption of the lex loci celebrationis prin-
ciple. Since the rule does not distinguish between form and substance, it 
is clear and simple to apply. All aspects of the foreign marriage are go-
verned by a single law, thereby avoiding the problematic distinctions and 
other difficulties involved in applying the personal law system,187 such as 
cases in which the parties are subject to different personal laws.188 The 
principle of lex loci celebrationis also promotes the interest of comity 
and international cooperation. As Justice Sussman stated in the Funk-
Schlesinger case: 
Any country that wishes to live in harmony with the family of nations 
must relinquish the implementation of some of its laws when a foreign 
element arises and intervenes in a legal action . . . . Just as we demand 
that other nations recognize Israeli law, we must not disqualify a trans-
action which is governed by a foreign law that is different from our 
                                                                                                             
 187. Indeed, referring to the personal law of the parties with respect to the substance of 
marriage may also serve to promote convenience, simplicity, and efficiency in that it 
renders any need to examine the rules of foreign legal systems virtually unnecessary. 
Despite this, the personal law system may also cause various complications, particularly 
when the parties have different domiciles at the time of the marriage. For discussion of 
the difficulties involved in the implementation of each of the approaches taken under 
English law in order to determine the personal law of the parties, see supra notes 150–
152. Furthermore, whether or not choice of law rules can engender convenience and effi-
ciency, the importance of these considerations should not be overstated, particularly with 
respect to the determination of personal status and especially in the field of private inter-
national law, which involves, by its very nature, complex and unusual situations. 
 188. Given that the place of celebration principle, as opposed to the personal law sys-
tem, examines the event rather than the parties themselves, it resolves the difficulty that 
derives from the need to ensure that the applicable law is appropriate for both parties. See 
Schuz, supra note 114, at 156–57. 
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own. To the extent that choice of law jurisprudence refers us to a for-
eign law, Israeli law must yield.189 
The principle also promotes legal certainty, stability, and predictability, 
and prevents limping marriages. Even if the extent of the need for cer-
tainty and stability is liable to change from one legal field to another, 
there is no doubt that these considerations are essential in the field of 
personal status.190 
The policy objectives of the choice of law rules for marriage recogni-
tion are thus best advanced by the principle of the law of the place of 
celebration. Adoption of this rule in Israel is arguably also required in 
light of the unique legal and social situation. In the words of the then 
Chief Justice Barak in the matter of A v. The Rabbinical Court: 
Thousands of Jews who are citizens and residents of Israel wish to 
marry by means of a civil marriage that takes place outside Israel. This 
is a social phenomenon that the law should take into account. [In the 
past, some Supreme Court Justices] expressed the opinion in obiter re-
marks that with regard to the validity of marriages that take place out-
side Israel between Israeli citizens or residents, it is sufficient that they 
are valid according to the law of the place where they were contracted, 
even if the spouses are not competent to marry under their personal 
law. Within the framework of the petition before us, we do not need to 
make a decision with regard to this position, and we need only adopt 
the more moderate position that the marriage is valid if the couple are 
competent to marry under their personal law and the marriage cere-
mony took place within the framework of a foreign legal system that 
recognizes it.191 
Admittedly, the adoption of the personal law system for marriage recog-
nition in England—as well as in other Western countries—ultimately did 
not seriously undermine the fundamental policy of validation. Given the 
small number of impediments imposed by English law on the capacity of 
the parties to marry, courts recognize the majority of foreign marriages 
between English residents.192 
In contrast, the application of the personal law system in Israel—which 
imposes a long list of marital impediments—will severely infringe upon 
the right to family life of many groups in the Israeli population, particu-
                                                                                                             
 189. HCJ 143/62 Funk-Schlesinger v. Minister of Interior 17(1) PD 225, 256 [1963] 
(Isr.). 
 190. See Shapira, Comments, supra note 98, at 288. 
 191. HCJ 2232/03 A. v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Regional Rabbinical Court (2) IsrLR 245, ¶ 26 
[2006] (internal citations omitted). 
 192. For a discussion of the restrictions that English law imposes on the capacity of the 
parties to marry, see infra Part V. 
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larly same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples lacking capacity to mar-
ry in Israel. Thus, it would appear that given the special situation in 
Israel, and in light of the constitutional status of the right to family life 
and marriage,193F193 a choice of law rule that invalidates, a priori, all foreign 
marriages of Israeli couples who are ineligible for religious marriage, 
should not be adopted. Opting for the place of celebration rule in Israel 
will lead to the proper result of recognizing foreign civil marriages, sub-
ject to public policy considerations. Thus, the adoption of the lex loci 
celebrationis principle would also be consistent with the modern “conse-
quentialist theory” of conflicts law, which dictates that the appropriate 
choice of law rule is that which leads to the just result.194F194 Adopting this 
principle, however, would not entail recognition of all marriages per-
formed outside of Israel even though valid under the lex loci celebratio-
nis, since, again, this rule is subject to a public policy exception. 
V. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION AND THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN 
MARRIAGES 
A. Ordre Public Externe in the Field of Marriage Recognition—
Interpretative Criteria 
The doctrine of public policy, a fundamental principle of private inter-
national law, is used as a barrier to the recognition of a foreign act that 
contradicts key social interests of the forum. Public policy is a flexible 
concept with no exhaustive definition, embodying the vital public inter-
ests and basic values of the particular society.195F195 Accordingly, its mean-
                                                                                                             
 193. The Israeli Supreme Court has held that the right to family life—which encom-
passes the right of an individual to belong to a family unit, the right of a couple to marry 
and live together, the right to bear children, the right of parents to raise their children and 
care for them, and the right of children to grow up with their parents—is grounded in the 
constitutional rights to privacy, self-fulfillment, and dignity and liberty, as enshrined in 
the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. See CA 7155/96 John Doe v. Attorney Gen-
eral 51(1) PD 160, 175 [1997] (Isr.); see also HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of the 
Interior (May 14, 2006), Takdinet Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 194. See generally Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 
1277 (1989). 
 195. In the words of Chief Justice Barak in the case of Efrat v. Director of Population 
Registry, Ministry of Interior: “‘Public policy’ encompasses the central and essential 
values, interests and principles that a given society at a given time wishes to uphold, pre-
serve and develop . . . . Public policy is the legal tool by means of which society ex-
presses its credo. With this it creates new normative frameworks and prevents the intro-
duction of undesirable normative arrangements into existing frameworks.” HCJ 693/91 
Efrat v. Director of Population Registry, Ministry of Interior 47(1) PD 749, 779 [1993] 
(Isr.) (author’s translation from the Hebrew). 
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ing and scope may vary from one jurisdiction to another. The content of 
public policy in a given country is also liable to change over time as legal 
and social changes affect the fundamental views of society.196 For the 
purposes of private international law, it is customary to differentiate be-
tween “internal public policy” (ordre public interne), which embodies 
local values and interests that are superseded by the rules of private in-
ternational law, and “external public policy” (ordre public externe), 
which consists of basic local principles and interests on vital issues and 
takes precedence over the regular rules of private international law.197 
External public policy, then, concerns fundamental principles and su-
perior interests of society and the state. The scope of the doctrine in pri-
vate international law is substantially narrower than in domestic law.198 
Differences between domestic and foreign law, alone, certainly do not 
justify application of the public policy doctrine.199 According to both 
Anglo-American and Israeli private international law, the exception may 
be invoked only when implementation of the foreign law would yield 
                                                                                                             
 196. See Amos Shapira, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments In Perso-
nam in Israel, 3 TEL. AVIV U. STUD. L. 171, 189 (1977) [hereinafter Shapira, Recogni-
tion]. The doctrine of public policy was explicitly incorporated into a number of statutory 
provisions of Israeli private international law. For instance, the Foreign Judgments En-
forcement Law of 1958 stipulates that “a foreign judgment shall not be declared enforce-
able if its enforcement is likely to prejudice the sovereignty or security of Israel” and the 
court may refuse to declare a foreign judgment enforceable if its content contradicts 
Israeli public policy. See Foreign Judgments Enforcement Law, 5718–1958, 12 LSI 82, 
§§ 3(3), 7 (1957–1958) (Isr.); see also Succession Law, 5725–1965, 19 LSI 58, § 143 
(1964–1965) (Isr.) (stating that the applicable foreign law will be disregarded if it discri-
minates on the basis of race, religion, sex or ethnic origin, or contradicts Israel’s public 
policy). 
 197. See Shapira, Recognition, supra note 196, at 190. In the words of the Court in the 
Funk-Schlesinger case: “[T]here are exceptional cases in which the granting of validity to 
foreign law and to the result deriving from it will greatly impair the public order by 
which we live, and only when a foreign law stands in contrast with the sentiment of jus-
tice and morality of the Israeli public, will we deny its application.” HCJ 143/62 Funk-
Schlesinger v. Minister of Interior 17(1) PD 225, 256 [1963] (Isr.) (author’s translation 
from the Hebrew). 
 198. CELIA WASSERSTEIN FASSBERG, FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN ISRAELI LAW 21 (1996). 
 199. Justice Cardozo famously remarked: “We are not so provincial as to say that 
every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.” Loucks 
v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918); see also Alex Mills, The 
Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law, 4 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 201, 212 
(2008) (“An English court will ordinarily apply foreign law or recognize and enforce a 
foreign judgment even if the result is different from that which would be reached under 
English law, and probably even if the cause of action is unknown to English law.”). 
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abhorrent and intolerable results that infringe on the social and public 
order of the forum state.200 
Since the Supreme Court of Israel has fully recognized civil marriages 
conducted abroad by Israeli citizens and residents eligible for marriage in 
Israel, it follows that the mere fact of conducting a civil marriage cere-
mony does not violate the external public policy of Israel.201 The ques-
tion that has yet to be answered is whether the essential recognition of 
foreign marriages of same-sex couples, as well as opposite-sex couples 
ineligible for marriage in Israel, conflicts with one of the fundamental 
principles reflected in Israel’s external public policy, or whether the ma-
rital impediments imposed by domestic law only reflect Israel’s internal 
public policy. In order to answer this question, this Article turns first to 
the solutions employed by other jurisdictions and then examines whether 
the unique characteristics of the regulation of marriage within Israel has 
implications for its external public policy. 
Over the years, English and American courts have formulated a num-
ber of guiding principles regarding the interpretation of external public 
policy in the field of marriage recognition.202 As previously discussed, 
the fundamental policy of private international law in the field of mar-
riage recognition is the validation of foreign marriages.203 Accordingly, 
courts in both the United States and England usually interpret external 
public policy quite narrowly.204 This interpretation of the public policy 
exception is not only based on the principle of validation, but also on the 
                                                                                                             
 200. See, e.g., Cheni v. Cheni, [1965] P. 85 at 98–99 (Eng.). 
 201. See HCJ 2232/03 A. v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Regional Rabbinical Court (2) IsrLR 245 
[2006]. 
 202. Despite the local nature of public policy, there has been a growing trend to ex-
pand the doctrine so that appropriate legal concepts derived from foreign private and 
public law are often applied in the forum. For instance, in 2000 the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities held in Krombach v. Bamberski that the examination shall be 
conducted according to European public policy, and that the judgments of state courts 
will be examined by this criterion. See Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski, 2000 
E.C.R. I-1935. Specifically, the court noted: “Consequently, while it is not for the Court 
to define the content of the public policy of a Contracting State, it is none the less re-
quired to review the limits within which the courts of a Contracting State may have re-
course to that concept for the purpose of refusing recognition to a judgment emanating 
from a court in another Contracting State.” Id. ¶ 23. 
 203. See Wardle, International Marriage, supra note 139, at 514 (“Clearly the predo-
minant policy among nations today is to prefer marriage, and to impose relatively few 
conditions on marriage. Likewise, there appears to be a presumption in favor of recogniz-
ing foreign marriages, as a general rule. Accommodating personal autonomy seems to be 
a stronger part of marriage policy today than in the past.”). 
 204. See PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 
8–9, 13. 
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understanding that a broad interpretation of the doctrine is likely to lead 
to redundancy of the rules of private international law.205 This approach 
is also evident by the language of the exception in the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws: 
A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the mar-
riage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it 
violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most 
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of 
the marriage.206 
The Restatement leaves the task of defining the content and scope of 
public policy in the hands of the courts. 
In order to determine whether the recognition of a foreign marriage vi-
olates the “strong” public policy of the state to which the parties hold the 
majority of connections, United States courts typically examine a number 
of factors.207 First, the courts usually examine whether the given mar-
riage is deemed void or merely voidable under the law of the state which 
is asked to recognize it, based on the view that voidable marriages are 
not likely to be found to violate a strong public policy.208 Second, the 
courts usually inquire whether entry into the type of marriage under con-
sideration violates the forum state’s penal statutes; if it does, recognition 
                                                                                                             
 205. See MORRIS, MCCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra note 143, at 54. 
 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971). In the absence of 
legislation on the question of the validity of marriages conducted outside the forum, the 
American courts refer to the general principles of private international law, including the 
Restatement. The choice of law rule stipulated in the Restatement was incorporated into 
the laws of about half of the states in the United States. Koppelman, supra note 178, at 
981. The accepted definition of public policy under English law is as follows: “English 
courts will not enforce or recognise a right, power, capacity, disability or legal relation-
ship arising under the law of a foreign country, if the enforcement or recognition of such 
right, power, capacity, disability or legal relationship would be inconsistent with the fun-
damental public policy of English Law.” 1 DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 81 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 13th ed. 2000). For a detailed discussion of the 
public policy exception in England, see NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 138, at 128–37. 
 207. BLAIR & WEINER, supra note 175, at 378–79. 
 208. Thus, for instance, most United States courts held that their relevant statutes re-
garding nonage only made a marriage voidable and therefore did not reflect a strong 
enough public policy to invalidate a foreign marriage contracted by local domiciliaries. 
See PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 71. Ac-
cordingly, in the majority of cases such marriages (valid under the lex loci celebrationis) 
were upheld even when the parties conducted their marriage in a foreign country with the 
clear intention of evading the prohibition in their home state, and even where the home 
state had a marriage evasion statute for foreign marriages of local domiciliaries. See, e.g., 
State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1957); see also PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN 
COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 70–71. 
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may be found to violate a strong public policy.209 Third, the courts may 
undertake a comparative examination of the manner in which other coun-
tries view marriages of the kind at issue, verifying whether the prohibi-
tion is deemed contrary to public policy in the majority of states or only 
in a few of them.210 An additional factor frequently considered is the 
specific “purpose for which the determination regarding the validity of 
the marriage is being made.”211 
However, a careful examination of the relevant case law shows that 
none of the aforementioned factors has alone been regarded as decisive 
in determining the validity of foreign marriages.212 On the whole, the 
policy of validation usually prevails, and even the accumulation of a 
number of factors does not necessarily lead to the invalidation of the for-
eign marriage by virtue of the public policy exception. For instance, the 
mere fact that the marriage is void under the law of the forum has rarely 
served, on its own, as a basis for finding a violation of strong public poli-
cy.213 The rare cases in which US courts applied the exception were 
those where, in addition to the marriage being void under the laws of the 
forum, it contravened a criminal sanction considered odious by the 
common consent of nations, such as bigamy or incest.214 Even in cases of 
this sort, the courts have occasionally been reluctant to invalidate the 
foreign marriage.215 English case law reveals a similar approach.216 
                                                                                                             
 209. BLAIR & WEINER, supra note 175, at 378. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id.; see, e.g., In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1948). In the case of In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, a California appellate court recog-
nized a polygamous marriage, holding “that it would not violate public policy to recog-
nize both marriages and divide a decedent’s estate between his two surviving wives, 
whom he had legally married in India and who still both resided there, particularly where 
both wives agreed to equal division and there were no other interested parties.” BLAIR & 
WEINER, supra note 175, at 378. 
 212. See BLAIR & WEINER, supra note 175, at 378–79. 
 213. PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 22. 
 214. See, e.g., People. v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (non-
recognition of a polygamous marriage). 
 215. PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 21–
22, 76; see also Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (mother’s mar-
riage to her uncle, valid in the place of celebration, did not preclude award of custody to 
mother, despite state penal statute indicating that incestuous marriages were contrary to 
public policy). 
 216. See, e.g., Cheni v. Cheni, [1965] P. 85 (Eng.). As the Cheni case demonstrates, 
recognition of marriages performed outside of England (and valid under the personal 
laws of the parties) between relatives whose degree of affinity does not constitute the 
criminal offense of incest (as defined in English law) does not violate English public 
policy, despite the prohibition on the performance of such marriages in England itself. 
Id.; cf. Mohamed v. Knott, [1969] 1 Q.B. 1 (Eng.) (recognition of a marriage performed 
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These Anglo-American criteria for interpreting the scope of external 
public policy in the field of marriage recognition developed through case 
law and mostly relate to the three limitations on the right to marriage 
shared by all Western nations—nonage, polygamy, and incest—and on 
the various policy considerations underlying each of them.217 Notwith-
standing the prohibition on same-sex marriage, which is gradually erod-
ing,218 the three aforementioned impediments are the only restrictions on 
the capacity to marry that remain as absolute prohibitions in both Eng-
land and the United States (as in most other Western nations).219 Al-
though Israeli law imposes a host of additional restrictions on capacity, 
deriving from the exclusive application of religious law to matters of 
marriage and divorce,220 the criteria formulated in Anglo-American case 
law can also be of assistance in identifying and formulating the bounda-
ries of Israel’s external public policy. The above criteria embody the 
view that the application of the exception may be justified only in ex-
treme and exceptional cases, where recognition of the marriage would 
adversely affect the overall societal interest in that it would violate fun-
damental principles and widely accepted vital moral values. This insight 
should also guide the Israeli courts in the application of the public policy 
exception. 
B. Israel’s Public Policy and the Tension Between Secular Law and Re-
ligious Norms 
The unique question that arises under Israeli law is whether the exclu-
sive application of religious law in matters of marriage and divorce 
should impact the content of Israel’s external public policy. In order to 
answer this question, it is useful to classify the capacity restrictions im-
posed by Israeli religious law into three main categories. The first in-
cludes restrictions that could be justified by secular-democratic ratio-
nales, including nonage, polygamy, and incest.221 The second category 
                                                                                                             
in Nigeria between an adult and a 13 year-old girl, despite this type of marriage being 
prohibited in England); MORRIS, MCCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra note 143, at 213–17. 
 217. As stated by the House of Lords in the matter Radwan v. Radwan: “[I]t is an 
oversimplification of the common law to assume that the same test . . . applies to every 
kind of incapacity—non age, affinity, prohibition of monogamous contract by virtue of 
an existing spouse, and capacity for polygamy. Different public and social factors are 
relevant to each of these types of incapacity . . . .” Radwan v. Radwan, [1973] Fam. 35 at 
51. 
 218. See infra Part V.C. 
 219. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 40–58 (1989). 
 220. See supra note 6 and infra note 222. 
 221. The minimum age of marriage according to Jewish law is 13 for boys and 12.5 for 
girls. The Marriage Age Law of 1950 stipulates that the minimum age of marriage is 17. 
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includes restrictions whose rationale may be regarded as “purely reli-
gious,” including, inter alia, prohibitions on marriages of persons “dis-
qualified for religious marriage” and on interfaith marriages.222F222 The third 
category includes the prohibition on same-sex marriages—a prohibition 
that may be regarded as a “semi-religious” impediment.223F223 
Although religious laws mandate all the marital impediments in Israel, 
the restrictions classified under the first category above could also be 
rationalized by secular-democratic considerations, and they should not be 
regarded as reflecting only religious norms. Alongside the religious pro-
hibitions on nonage, polygamy, consanguinity, and affinity, Israeli secu-
lar law imposes criminal sanctions on incest, entry into bigamous mar-
riages, and marriages of minors.224F224 The Israeli legislature, which is reluc-
tant to directly intervene in religious marriage laws, has limited its inter-
vention to the imposition of criminal sanctions on the entry into marriag-
es that it wished to prevent, without asserting a position on their validi-
ty. 225F225 Accordingly, if a marriage were valid under the personal law of the 
parties but violated criminal law, the criminal sanctions would be im-
posed without invalidating the marriage itself. 
However, rendering these religious impediments as criminal offenses 
no doubt strengthens the secular Israeli public policy regarding those 
prohibitions. It would thus appear that as far as this first category of im-
pediments is concerned, there is no tension between the religious and 
secular laws. The main objective of those prohibitions is to sustain fun-
                                                                                                             
See Marriage Age Law, 5710–1950, 4 LSI 158, § 2 (1949–1950) (Isr.). Jewish law also 
prohibits polygamy and incestuous marriages. See 1 PINHAS SHIFMAN, FAMILY LAW IN 
ISRAEL 186 (1995). Although the degree of prohibited kinship may change from one legal 
system to another and from one religious law to another, the prohibition on consanguinity 
and affinity is shared by all religions and all cultures. For a discussion of the degree and 
extent of the prohibition under Jewish law, see id. 
 222. “Under Jewish Law, a marriage between a Jew and a non-Jew is void ab initio.” 
Merin, The Right to Family Life, supra note 6, at 135. The category of persons “disquali-
fied for religious marriage . . . . includes, inter alia, the prohibition against the marriage 
of a Kohen (a descendant of the ancient priestly caste) to a divorced woman, to a chalut-
zah (a widow released from a levirate marriage), or to a convert.” Id. at 135–36. Al-
though such marriages are prohibited, Jewish law regards them as retroactively valid, but 
requires the couple to divorce one another. See id. at 136. 
 223. For further discussion of this category, see infra Part V.C. 
 224. Sections 176 and 351 of the Penal Law specify bigamy and incest, respectively, 
as criminal offenses. See Penal Law, 5737–1977, Special Volume LSI 55, 93 (1977) 
(Isr.). Section 2 of the Marriage Age Law specifies a criminal sanction against a man or 
woman who marries a girl or a boy under the age of seventeen, respectively. See Mar-
riage Age Law, 5710–1950, 4 LSI 158, § 2 (1949–1950) (Isr.). 
 225. See Pinhas Shifman, Family Law in Israel: The Struggle Between Religious and 
Secular Law, 24 ISR. L. REV. 537, 539 (1990). 
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damental values and to protect the weaker parties, and they reflect the 
overall societal interest.226F226 These three restrictions are shared by all 
Western nations, without exception, and they will certainly remain intact 
even if Israel enacts an arrangement for civil marriage. In light of the 
rationales behind these three prohibitions, and in reliance on the criteria 
formulated in Anglo-American law, the recognition of marriages entered 
into in violation of these prohibitions may, subject to the individual cir-
cumstances of the case, be found to violate Israel’s external public poli-
cy. 
Aside from the three restrictions shared by all Western countries, Israe-
li law imposes a long list of additional unique restrictions on the right to 
marry, deriving from the exclusive application of religious law to matters 
of marriage and divorce. Within this context, the question that arises is 
whether external Israeli public policy should only reflect secular norms 
(such as the norms underlying the prohibitions listed in the first category) 
or whether it should also reflect the “purely religious” norms included in 
the second category. 
First, it should be noted that most legal systems invoke public policy 
specifically in order to avoid the application of foreign laws that restrict 
the freedom of marriage on religious grounds.227F227 Although, unlike all 
                                                                                                             
 226. The rationale behind the requirement for a minimum age of marriage “is that the 
free consent of the [parties] is a prerequisite for marriage, and that it is necessary to es-
tablish a minimum age in order to ensure that this consent is, in fact, given freely. Anoth-
er reason [for minimum age] is the need to guarantee a stable married life and the view 
that such stability can only be guaranteed if the two spouses are mature enough to be 
fully aware of their obligations within the family context.” Merin, The Right to Family 
Life, supra note 6, at 125. The prohibition against bigamy and polygamy is based on the 
principle of equality between the sexes and is designed to uproot sexist customs accepted 
in various traditional societies. See id. at 128. The prohibition against incestuous mar-
riages on grounds of consanguinity and affinity should not be regarded as a religious 
norm either, since “it is accepted in all civilized societies and has rational justifications 
that suffice on their own . . . . [O]ne of the explanations for this prohibition is based on 
genetics and the fear that children born to [blood related couples] are liable to be afflicted 
with various genetic defects . . . . [T]he genetic [concern] does not justify prohibitions 
based on relations by marriage and, in this matter, it seems that the rationale stems from 
psychological and sociological considerations.” Id. at 127–28. 
 227. PÅLSSON, MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 56, at 338. 
This approach is reflected in the 2005 Resolution of the Institute of International Law, 
regarding the use of the public policy exception in the context of recognition of foreign 
marriages. See INST. OF INT’L LAW, RESOLUTION: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND ORDER 
PUBLIC IN FAMILY PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § B(1) (2005), available at 
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_02_en.pdf. According to the Institute’s 
Resolution, “States shall guarantee respect for freedom of marriage. This means that, for 
the purposes of private international law, States shall invoke public policy against foreign 
laws that restrict that freedom on racial or religious grounds, and recognize the validity of 
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other Western countries, the institution of marriage in Israel is regulated 
exclusively by religious law, it seems that civil courts in Israel have also 
refrained from taking religious norms into consideration in determining 
and formulating Israeli public policy. The Supreme Court has held more 
than once that it determined Israeli internal public policy according to 
“the accepted views of the enlightened public,”228 and that “public policy 
in Israel must not be identified with the legal policy of religious law.”229 
The Supreme Court also held that public policy “is aimed at the public at 
large [encompassing] its diversity, various opinions, beliefs, and reli-
gions,” and that it is formed in accordance with the conventional wisdom 
of the “enlightened public,” in consideration of the complexity and plu-
ralism of Israeli society.230 Accordingly, the Supreme Court stated (albeit 
in dictum) that even if a certain type of marriage is considered forbidden 
or a sin under religious law, that alone will not render the marriage as 
violating Israeli internal public policy.231 
The Supreme Court has thus made a distinction between the public 
policy of religious law (applied in the religious tribunals) and the public 
policy of Israeli law in general (applied in civil courts), never regarding 
itself as bound by the views of religious law even with regard to Israeli 
internal public policy. In accordance with this view, civil courts have 
applied secular public policy—that based upon the freedom of con-
science and the freedom to marry—even in matters of personal status. 
Such was the case, for instance, when the Supreme Court recognized a 
private marriage ceremony in Israel of an opposite-sex couple “disquali-
fied for religious marriage,” despite the fact that this was clearly a matter 
of marriage and divorce subject to Jewish law and that the Rabbinical 
Court does not recognize private marriage ceremonies.232 It was not reli-
gious, but rather, secular considerations that guided the court in this mat-
                                                                                                             
a marriage celebrated in violation of the religious prescriptions of the normally applicable 
law.” Id. The Resolution further states: “Public policy should be invoked against the 
normally applicable law only to the extent that, in the circumstances of the case, the ap-
plication of that law would infringe the principles of equality, non-discrimination and 
freedom of religion.” Id. § A(3). 
 228. CA 461/62 Zim Israel Navigation Co. v. Maziar 17 PD 1319, 1335 [1963] (opi-
nion of Landau, J.) (Isr.). 
 229. HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Registry, Ministry of Interior 47(1) 
PD 749, 781–82 [1993] (Isr.). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. (referring to the example of interfaith marriages). 
 232. See HCJ 29/71 Kedar v. The Regional Rabbinical Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa 26(1) 
PD 608 [1972] (Isr.); HCJ 51/69 Rodnizki v. The Rabbinical Court 24(1) PD 707 [1969] 
(Isr.); HCJ 80/63 Gurfinkel v. Minister of Interior 17 PD 2048 [1963] (Isr.); CA 238/53 
Cohen v. Attorney-General 8(4) PD 19 [1954] (Isr.). 
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ter—including the degree of legitimacy of impeding freedom of religion 
and the degree of protection afforded to the freedom to marry.233 Moreo-
ver, in the context of the discussion regarding the private marriages of 
couples “disqualified for religious marriage,” the Court expressed expli-
cit disapproval of the religious prohibition on marriages of this sort, stat-
ing that it was a “ritualistic-religious” impediment inconsistent with the 
fundamental values of a democratic state.234 
Similarly, the Supreme Court’s approach regarding the religious prohi-
bition on interfaith marriages is also based on secular considerations, 
rather than religious norms.235 This is the case despite the fact that unlike 
the marriages of couples “disqualified for religious marriage,” which 
under Jewish law are prohibited beforehand but valid a posteriori, mar-
riages between Jews and non-Jews are void ab initio.236 Unlike the posi-
tion taken regarding the private marriage ceremonies performed in Israel 
by couples “disqualified for religious marriage,” however, the Supreme 
Court refuses to recognize the private marriages of interfaith couples.237 
Nonetheless, it seems that the Court would have reached a different 
conclusion had it been faced with a petition to recognize a civil marriage 
ceremony of an interfaith couple performed outside of Israel. This is be-
cause the Supreme Court is apparently of the view that the public contro-
versy over the introduction of civil marriage within Israel (which would 
result in allowing interfaith marriages) cannot justify, in and of itself, the 
invalidation of interfaith marriages when they are conducted in a foreign 
country.238 Indeed, this position is clearly stated in the notable dictum of 
Justice Sussman in the Funk-Schlesinger case: 
                                                                                                             
 233. See sources cited id. 
 234. HCJ 80/63 Gurfinkel v. Minister of Interior 17 PD 2048, 2089 [1963] (Isr.) 
(“[The prohibition on marriages of a Cohen and a divorcee] is religious-ritualistic given 
that it is based on ancient concepts regarding the superior status of the Cohen. The impo-
sition of a prohibition of this sort on a non-believer is difficult to reconcile with the free-
dom of conscience and the freedom of action that it entails.”) (author’s translation from 
the Hebrew). 
 235. See, e.g., CA 373/72 Tapper v. State of Israel 28(2) PD 7, 12–13 [1974] (Isr.). 
 236. Muslim law, on the other hand, allows a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim 
woman. See SHIFMAN, supra note 221, at 188. 
 237. CA 373/72 Tapper v. State of Israel 28(2) PD 7 [1974] (Isr.). The case involved a 
petition to recognize the private marriage ceremony in Israel of an interfaith couple (a 
Jewish Israeli man and a Christian Swiss woman). Id. The couple argued that the Court 
should adopt the English institution of common law marriage, and thereby recognize their 
private ceremony. Id. The Court did not in any way disapprove of interfaith marriages as 
such. Rather, it rejected the petition because it perceived the adoption of the institution of 
common law marriage as standing in contrast with Israeli public policy, depicting it as “a 
medieval religious institution which has become obsolete.” Id. at 12–13. 
 238. CA 373/72 Tapper v. State of Israel 28(2) PD 7, 9 [1974] (Isr.). 
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The fact that Jewish religious law considers interfaith marriages void 
does not, in itself, compel the secular court to reach the same conclu-
sion when it decides the question according to a foreign law. Only if 
the court reaches the conclusion that the marriage is offensive to Israeli 
external (international) public policy, that is if such a marriage is so of-
fensive to public policy that it should be considered void irrespective of 
wherever it has been celebrated, and then the court should give it no ef-
fect. 
However, religious impediments to marriage, important as they may be, 
should not be decisive in such cases. The Israeli public is divided into 
two camps—one which observes religious law or most of its com-
mands, and another which emphasizes the difference between a state 
abiding by the rule of law and a state abiding by religious law [halak-
ha]. The views of these two groups are entirely at odds with each other. 
Israeli public policy does not dictate that the judge will compel one 
camp to follow the views of the other. Life demands tolerance towards 
the other and showing consideration for differing views. Therefore, the 
yardstick of the judge must be the balance of all views prevailing in the 
public.239 
This statement, written in 1963, reflects the position of the “enlightened 
Israeli public” on this issue to this day. It would thus appear that the rec-
ognition of foreign civil marriages of opposite-sex couples who are in-
eligible for marriage within Israel due to “purely religious” impediments 
is not in conflict with Israel’s external public policy. Thus, one is left 
with one remaining issue—whether a distinction should be drawn for the 
purposes of external public policy between the religious prohibitions on 
marriages of opposite-sex couples and the prohibition against same-sex 
marriages. 
C. Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception 
Orthodox Judaism does not perceive same-sex marriage as a forbidden 
category—it is simply nonexistent.240 Moreover, same-sex relations are 
subject to harsh and extreme condemnation under Orthodox Judaism.241 
Therefore, the recognition of a foreign same-sex marriage is undoubtedly 
contrary to the public policy of religious law in Israel.242 Unlike the reli-
                                                                                                             
 239. HCJ 143/62 Funk-Schlesinger v. Minister of Interior 17(1) PD 225, 256–57 
[1963] (Isr.). 
 240. See SHIFMAN, supra note 221, at 183. 
 241. The Conservative and the Reform movements hold a much more lenient approach 
toward same-sex unions. See supra note 5. 
 242. Given the separation of religion and state, United States courts have taken a very 
different approach. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 
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gious prohibitions on certain types of marriages between opposite-sex 
couples, though, most Western countries, including Israel, do not perce-
ive the prohibition against same-sex marriage as a “purely religious” im-
pediment. Despite the fact that a growing number of jurisdictions have 
opened the institution of marriage to same-sex couples, the majority of 
Western countries—notwithstanding their legal definition of marriage as 
a civil-secular right—still prohibit such marriages.243 Therefore, as op-
posed to the Israeli prohibitions on interfaith marriages and on the mar-
riages of opposite-sex couples “disqualified for religious marriage,” the 
prohibition against same-sex marriages may very well remain intact even 
if Israel decides to introduce the option of civil marriage. It would seem 
that the common view—both in Israel and in the majority of Western 
countries—is that the state could justify the prohibition against same-sex 
marriage not only on the basis of religious convictions, but also on the 
basis of “secular” rationales. It is therefore fitting to classify the prohibi-
tion as a “semi-religious impediment.” 
As discussed supra in Part V.B., in the context of the configuration of 
Israel’s public policy, the Israeli civil courts do not view themselves 
bound by religious norms and interests. The question must be posed, 
then, whether the recognition of same-sex marriages performed abroad 
by Israeli residents and citizens is contrary to Israeli secular public poli-
                                                                                                             
2008). In Kerrigan, the Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected the argument that opening 
up of marriage to same-sex couples would infringe upon the freedom of religion, stating: 
“[R]eligious autonomy is not threatened by recognizing the right of same sex couples to 
marry civilly. Religious freedom will not be jeopardized by the marriage of same sex 
couples because religious organizations that oppose same sex marriage as irreconcilable 
with their beliefs will not be required to perform same sex marriages or otherwise to con-
done same sex marriage or relations. Because, however, marriage is a state sanctioned 
and state regulated institution, religious objections to same sex marriage cannot play a 
role in our determination of whether constitutional principles of equal protection mandate 
same sex marriage.” Id. at 475. 
 243. The countries and districts that have thus far opened the institution of marriage to 
same-sex couples are: the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, South Africa, Norway, 
Sweden, Iceland, Portugal, Argentina, Mexico City, and five states in the United States 
(Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, and New Hampshire) as well as the District 
of Columbia. See Timeline of Gay and Lesbian Marriage, Partnership or Unions World-
wide, UK GAY NEWS, www.ukgaynews.org.uk/marriage_timeline.htm (last updated Dec. 
23, 2010). Many other countries have recognized same-sex couples through the estab-
lishment of marriage-like institutions (such as “civil unions” and “registered partner-
ships”), which accord those couples many of the rights associated with marriage, includ-
ing: Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Australia, Hungary, Switzerland, England, Ireland, 
France, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Slovenia, and a number of 
states in the United States (including New Jersey, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, and Ne-
vada). See id. 
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cy. Even though the prohibition against same-sex marriage is ostensibly 
also based on secular considerations, it is difficult to ascertain any ra-
tional liberal justifications for the prohibition. In fact, it appears that the 
“secular” arguments proffered by opponents of same-sex marriage—both 
in Israel and in the majority of the Western world—constitute a pretext 
for prejudice against gay men and lesbians. 
The most common argument offered to justify the prohibition on same-
sex marriages is a definitional-moral-traditional argument, according to 
which marriage, by its very nature, is and has always been limited to a 
union between a man and a woman.244 Therefore, as the argument goes, 
since the institution of marriage was historically rooted in the need to 
foster procreation, same-sex couples do not fall within the realm of the 
definition of marriage, and their inclusion in the institution would be de-
trimental to its very stability as the fundamental organ for the existence 
and survival of the human race.245 The main flaw of the above argument 
is that it disregards the considerable social and legal changes in the per-
ception and the characteristics of marriage that have taken place over the 
last few decades—namely, the shift in the concept of marriage from a 
patriarchal property arrangement for the purpose of procreation, with 
specific gender roles assigned to each of the partners, to a unitive institu-
                                                                                                             
 244. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 87–104 
(1996).  
 245. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & 
POL. 581, 593–97 (1999); Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 
84 GEO. L.J. 261, 268–70 (1995) (offering a critical assessment of the conservative case 
for discrimination against homosexuals, including the procreation argument); Lynn D. 
Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU 
L. REV. 1, 33–35 (1996) [hereinafter Wardle, A Critical Analysis]; James Q. Wilson, 
Against Homosexual Marriage, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL 
DEBATE 137 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997). This concept has led 
to the adoption of the various federal and state Defense of Marriage Acts (“DoMA”), 
whose constitutionality has recently been challenged. See, e.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. 
Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d (D. Mass 2010) (holding that DoMA’s prohibition against ex-
tending federal benefits to gay couples in Massachusetts—including filing a joint in-
come-tax return or claiming spousal Social Security benefits—is unconstitutional, reason-
ing that the Act was driven solely by animus against gay people, which could not serve as 
a legitimate basis for government action); see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921, 998, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking down California’s voter-approved ban 
on same-sex marriage, and thereby rejecting defendant’s argument that same-sex mar-
riage would damage traditional marriage, holding that: “Tradition alone . . . cannot form a 
rational basis for a law [under the Equal Protection Clause]. The ‘ancient lineage’ of a 
classification does not make it rational. Rather, the state must have an interest apart from 
the fact of the tradition itself . . . . [M]oral disapproval, without any other asserted state 
interest, has never been a rational basis for legislation.”) (second alteration in original) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
2011] CHOICE OF LAW AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN ISRAEL 559 
tion whose regulation is primarily aimed at furthering the emotional and 
economic relationship between the spouses on equal terms.246 The defini-
tional argument thus ignores the fact that marriage is a changing institu-
tion whose religious, sexist, and patriarchal characteristics are fading 
more and more as time passes.247 Moreover, modern family law clearly 
differentiates between the regulation of the parent-child relationship and 
of that between the partners themselves, and the state regulates and en-
courages procreation and child-rearing in contexts that have nothing to 
do with marriage.248 
The definitional argument also ignores the transformations that have 
taken place in the structure of the modern family and the growing legal 
recognition of “post-modern” families. This is reflected, inter alia, in the 
abandonment of most distinctions that were once commonly made be-
tween parental rights of married opposite-sex couples and those of coha-
biting partners (of whatever sexual orientation) as well as in the changing 
assumptions regarding the best interest of the child.249 The “definitional” 
                                                                                                             
 246. See YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION 
OF GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 30–40 (2002). 
 247. See id. 
 248. See, e.g., Single Parent Families Law, 5752–1992, SH No. 147 (Isr.). The Consti-
tutional Court of South Africa has perhaps been the most persuasive in articulating this 
shift away from connecting marriage and procreation: 
From a legal and constitutional point of view procreative potential is not a de-
fining characteristic of conjugal relationships. Such a view would be deeply 
demeaning to couples (whether married or not) who, for whatever reason, are 
incapable of procreating when they commence such relationship or become so 
at any time thereafter. It is likewise demeaning to couples who commence such 
a relationship at an age when they no longer have the desire for sexual rela-
tions. It is demeaning to adoptive parents to suggest that their family is any less 
a family and any less entitled to respect and concern than a family with pro-
created children. I would even hold it to be demeaning of a couple who volun-
tarily decide not to have children or sexual relations with one another; this be-
ing a decision entirely within their protected sphere of freedom and privacy. 
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) 
para. 51 (S. Afr.). 
 249. Legal changes made to that effect in Israel include the Supreme Court’s decision 
to repeal the restrictions placed on the access of single women (including lesbians) to 
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization services. See HCJ 2078/96 Weiss v. Mi-
nister of Health (Feb. 11, 1997) (unpublished) (Isr.). Similarly, the Supreme Court has 
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argument is thus based on a conservative worldview that opposes social 
change of any kind and purports to maintain the traditional gender-role 
dichotomy and to preserve the patriarchal and heterosexist attributes of 
traditional marriage. 
An additional common argument against allowing marriages of same-
sex couples is the “slippery slope” argument, according to which the rec-
ognition of same-sex marriage would lead to, and even justify, the rec-
ognition of the marriages of minors, incestuous marriages, and polyga-
my.250 This argument is also tenuous. In certain religious circles same-
sex relationships are indeed perceived as no less abhorrent than incest.251 
However, under secular public policy, a clear distinction must be drawn 
between the prohibition against same-sex marriage on the one hand and 
the prohibitions against marriages of minors, incestuous marriages, and 
polygamous marriages, on the other hand. As previously discussed, the 
purpose of the latter prohibitions is the preservation of fundamental val-
ues such as the principle of gender equality and the protection of weaker 
parties.252 These considerations are not at all applicable to same-sex 
partners (who are single, adult, and unrelated to one another) and cannot 
justify the prohibition on their marriages.253 This view was clearly ex-
pressed by the New York Appellate Division in Martinez v. County of 
Monroe, in which the court held that despite the inability of same sex 
couples to marry within the State of New York, principles of comity 
compelled recognition of a marriage celebrated in Canada by a same-sex 
couple residing in New York.254 As the court stated: “[The natural law] 
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exception has generally been limited to marriages involving polygamy or 
incest or marriages ‘offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree 
regarded generally with abhorrence,’ and that cannot be said here.”255 
Moreover, as opposed to the criminal sanctions imposed by Israeli law 
on incest and on the entry into marriages involving minors and polyga-
my, not only did the legislature repeal Israel’s sodomy law more than 
two decades ago256 and provide extensive protections against discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation,257 but the Israeli courts have also 
accorded same-sex couples wide recognition and comprehensive protec-
tion in a variety of legal fields. For instance, same-sex couples have been 
recognized as “cohabitant partners” for the purpose of employment law, 
as well as for purposes of inheritance and immigration.258 
Furthermore, in the Ben-Ari case, in which the Supreme Court ordered 
the registration of the marriage in Canada of an Israeli same-sex couple, 
it refrained from holding that the marriage was in conflict with Israeli 
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public policy.259 Indeed, in that case the Court refrained from making 
any ruling on the validity of same-sex marriages performed in Canada, 
noting: “There is no application before us to recognize a marriage be-
tween two persons of the same sex that took place outside Israel. When 
this question arises, it will be examined in accordance with [the] ac-
cepted rules of private international law.”260 However, the Court regarded 
the State’s argument—according to which a foreign marriage should not 
be recognized unless it constitutes a “legal framework” of marriage that 
is recognized in Israel—as one that was really based upon public policy 
considerations.261 Accordingly, the rejection of the “legal framework” 
argument in the Ben-Ari case suggests that when the Supreme Court is 
faced with a petition to fully recognize a foreign same-sex marriage, it 
will refrain from holding that such recognition violates Israel’s external 
public policy. 
Given the characteristics of Israel’s external public policy in the field 
of marriage recognition and the criteria for its application, and consider-
ing the degree of recognition and protection afforded by Israeli law to 
same-sex couples and their families, the recognition of a foreign same-
sex marriage should not be viewed as contrary to Israel’s external public 
policy. Application of the Anglo-American criteria for determining 
whether recognition of a foreign marriage violates the strong public poli-
cy of the forum also indicates that the prohibition on same-sex marriage 
within Israel does not reflect a strong enough public policy for the inva-
lidation of such marriages when performed in a foreign country. As dis-
cussed, the mere fact that the marriage is deemed void by the law of the 
forum does not, in and of itself, lead to the application of the excep-
tion.262 The Anglo-American public policy exception has usually been 
utilized only when the void marriage was also performed in violation of 
the forum’s penal statutes.263 Even in such cases, some United States 
courts have been reluctant to apply the exception.264 
The Israeli courts should thus adopt the approach taken by the New 
York Appellate Court in the Martinez case, which held that recognition 
of a marriage between two people of the same sex does not give rise to 
moral repugnance, and that absent an explicit statutory prohibition on the 
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recognition of same-sex marriages performed in a foreign country265 (as 
opposed to the prohibition on same-sex marriages within the State of 
New York),266 the recognition of such marriages does not violate the 
state’s public policy.267 
CONCLUSION 
Israeli domestic law in the field of marriage and divorce severely in-
fringes upon the ability of many Israeli citizens and residents to fully 
realize their right to family life, including same-sex couples and oppo-
site-sex couples ineligible to marry in Israel due to restrictions imposed 
by religious law. The proper solution for ensuring the right of every indi-
vidual to marry, free of the shackles of religious law, is the introduction 
of civil marriage in Israel. However, such a solution is not expected in 
the foreseeable future. Under the current legal regime, couples prohibited 
from marrying in Israel are forced to travel abroad in order to realize 
their fundamental rights. The lack of recognition of marriages contracted 
abroad between persons ineligible for marriage within Israel due to reli-
gious impediments aggravates the infringement of their basic right to 
family life. 
The Israeli Supreme Court has utilized over the years two mechanisms 
in order to accord some of the rights of marriage to couples ineligible for 
religious marriage in Israel who performed a civil marriage ceremony 
abroad—the registration mechanism and the “marriage incidents” ap-
proach—but to date, the Court has refrained from ruling on the validity 
of those marriages. These alternative solutions are limited and insuffi-
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cient, as they accord the couple very few of the rights associated with 
marriage, leaving them uncertain of their status and of their rights and 
obligations vis-à-vis one another, as well as toward third parties. Al-
though by virtue of the registration of the foreign marriage and the rec-
ognition of some of its incidents the couple may enjoy a few of the rights 
associated with marriage, their foreign marriage is largely unrecognized. 
All Western legal systems accept the fundamental principle that where 
a foreign element is involved, the rules of private international law su-
persede domestic law. Based on this premise, and given the absence of a 
statutory choice of law rule for the recognition of marriages conducted 
outside of Israel, this Article attempts to propose criteria for the adoption 
of a choice of law rule that will correspond to the unique social and legal 
conditions prevalent in the State of Israel. The critical comparison be-
tween the two main choice of law systems for marriage recognition (the 
United States and England), as well as the examination of the different 
ramifications of the application of each of them in Israel, have led to the 
conclusion that the American choice of law rule referring to the lex loci 
celebrationis in matters of capacity is the one most appropriate for adop-
tion in Israeli law. 
The American rule is preferable, despite some of its flaws, since it best 
promotes the policy objectives of the choice of law rules in the field of 
marriage recognition, particularly in light of its emphasis on the policy of 
validation. The American rule serves to preserve family ties and stability 
and gives effect to the parties’ intentions; it also promotes certainty, con-
venience and predictability, as well as the uniformity of status, thereby 
preventing “limping marriages.”268 The adoption of the place of celebra-
tion rule is also preferable considering the injustice caused by the exclu-
sive application of religious law, whereby ancient rituals serve to deprive 
large groups of the Israeli population of the fundamental right of mar-
riage. The English rule, on the other hand, was largely designed in order 
to prevent English domiciliaries from evading the prohibitions prescribed 
by their personal law, thereby emphasizing the moral and cultural inter-
ests of the forum rather than the general principles of private internation-
al law.269 This is not to suggest that the social interests of the forum in 
maintaining the core aspects of its marriage institution should be disre-
garded; rather, those interests should be considered within the public pol-
icy exception, which was explicitly designed for that purpose. 
Accordingly, should the American choice of law rule be adopted in 
Israel, as suggested herein, it would not follow that all foreign marriages 
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of couples ineligible for marriage in Israel would be recognized under 
Israeli law, even though complying with the lex loci celebrationis. Some 
of those marriages may still be deemed invalid by virtue of the public 
policy exception. However, this Article argues that public policy should 
not be invoked against marriages performed in circumvention of the fo-
rum’s internal religious or semi-religious prescriptions. The public policy 
exception should instead be interpreted narrowly, as protecting only 
democratic, secular, rational, and liberal values, including the principle 
of equality, as well as the right to family life and freedom of conscience. 
Therefore, marriages of two single adults who are not related to one 
another, including same-sex couples, should be fully recognized under 
the Israeli conflict of laws. 
